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ABSTRACT OF THESIS
The Effects of the 2007-2009 Economic Crisis in the Global Automotive Industry
The automotive industry had been severely affected by the tightening of credit caused by
a subprime-lending crisis in the United States starting in the mid 2000’s. Demand for
automobiles had fallen sharply all over the globe, and sales plummeted to a three-decade
low in 2011. This caused serious repercussions, and the damage spread all over the world.
It was only with government assistance that the automotive industry quickly recovered
after the recession.
This paper, will study the relationship between the global financial crisis and the
automotive industry. It will focus on US car manufacturers as they were affected the
most. It will also analyze other major markets around the world, notably Europe and
Asia. This paper will reveal how auto manufacturers combatted the crisis, how
governments managed to rescue and protect auto industries, and how autoworkers had to
compromise. An analysis of their methods will be conducted. It has become clear that
government help was essential yet not beneficial to the companies in question in the long
run. Technology for environmental-friendly vehicles and quality improvement should be
the long-term focus of car manufacturers compared to short-term profits.
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1. Introduction
The automotive industry comprises 3% of gross global product. In many Western
countries this number is higher (3.6% in the US)1. Millions of workers worldwide are
employed in auto manufacturing, auto parts, and supplies manufacturing as well as
service and after sales care and other derivative industries. The auto industry produces
more than 800 million cars globally. More than 250 million vehicles are produced in the
United States. Despite the numbers, the level of interdependence caused by globalization
is hard to quantify. Suppliers and clients are spread around the world in a web of
relationships and obligations to one another.
The economic crisis of the mid to late 2000’s did not have an equal impact across
countries, companies, and employees. For example, in 2009, the dramatic impact of the
recession followed by a restructuring in the US automotive industry was not fully
mirrored in other mature markets in Europe or Japan. In the meantime, a very different
trend was observed in major emerging economies with large domestic markets such as
China, India, and Brazil, which experienced rising output as well as increased sales of
motor vehicles. Many opportunities for mergers and acquisitions were present around the
world. The crisis may have been a chance for Indian and Chinese auto manufacturers to
expand their markets and become world players. Chinese auto manufacturers, for
example,have since cut into the markets of US car manufacturers – particularly where
environmental standards are less stringent.
The poor performance of US automakers was exacerbated by the 2008 financial

1

Cole, David, et al. Car Research Memorandum The Impact of a Major Contraction of the Detroit
Three Automakers. PhD Thesis. Ann Arbor: Car Center for Automotive Research, 2008.
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crisis, which was then held responsible for the automotive crisis. The effects of the
financial crisis were more immediate on the employees than the shareholders. Therefore
the workers were reluctant to accept mass cuts in wages, pensions, and jobs from the
firms. The firms in turn were made more vulnerable by decreased lending and
unavailability of capital for their survival.
This study consists of nine sections including an introduction and a conclusion.
Following the introduction and literature review, the third section analyzes the
relationship between the financial crisis and the auto industry. Then follows a fourth
section: a review of the North American market. First a general analysis will be
predsented of American auto manufacturers, namely GM, Ford, and Chrysler (the Big
Three), and of their troubled state due to the crisis. Three phenomena augmented the
crisis: cost of fuel, cost of labor, and unavailability of credit. Industry data and related
facts will be listed to demonstrate how union workers and the excess of car brands
influenced the Big Three. A detailed review of the bailout process and its impact on auto
manufactures follows, along with a discussion of strategies and proposals by the
corporations. TSecond, there will be an examination of how the crisis hit Canada, and
how the Automotive Products Trade Agreement affected Canadian auto manufacturers.
There will be a detailed review of the conflict between the Canadian Auto Workers labor
union, car manufacturers, and the government.
Section five focuses on the European Union, including the auto markets of Russia,
Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. While the auto market in Europe
was relatively mature, both the luxury segment and massed-produced car segment were
both hit. Auto companies reacted with plant shutdowns and layoffs. Major auto

3

companies demanded subsidies from their respective states.
Section six recounts the story of the Asian markets, namely China, India, Japan,
and South Korea. In 2009 car sales in Japan fell to their lowest levels in the last thirty
years, while automakers in South Korea demonstrated higher profit margins compared to
their Japanese and American counterparts. Among major emerging economies with large
domestic markets, China and India experienced rising output. Governments in all these
countries subsidize their auto industries.
Section seven explores the various governments’ role in their automotive
industries, followed by section eight which gives an analysis and a prediction of the
future of the automotive industry.
Facts and examples in this paper seek to highlight the global nature of the crisis.
Although the focus is on the U.S market, other regions are highlighted as well. The
purpose of presenting these facts is to provide a thorough and detailed analysis as to
underlying events and the reactions of affected institutions, including auto manufacturers,
labor organizations and governments. This paper will attempt to reflect on the causes of
the financial crisis and associated issues of moral hazard and agency risk.

4

2. Literature Review
In their book The Great Book of Automobiles, Michael Bowler, Giuseppe
Guzzardi, and Enzo Rizzo once said, “As a symbol, more than almost any other
invention, the automobile has come to represent the 20th century and its technological
and commercial evolution. The automobile captures and reflects the great changes that
took place during 100 tumultuous years.”2 This quote indicates the very important role
the automotive industry plays in the global economic structure. The ILO (International
Labor Organization) reports that the auto industry has today become a major source of
employment worldwide. “The global workforce total probably climbed to just under 10
million by the end of 2007. According to a report in 2008 by the US independent think
tank the Economic Policy Institute, some 3.3 million jobs in the United States alone are
dependent on the continuing fortunes of the country’s car producers.”3
Therefore, when financial crisis in 2008 hit the global economy, it hit the car
industry with real intensity. The crisis in the global car industry has lead to huge job
losses. All the world’s major car companies announced a decrease in hours, reductions of
labor forces, or even closures. The largest car company and indeed the largest multinational for much of the twentieth century – General Motors – was in its death throes
with increasingly desperate interventions by the US government to keep it alive. In
January 2009, the Federal government used $24.9 billion of the $700 billion bank bailout
fund to rescue two of the Big Three: $17.4 billion for General Motors and Chrysler, $6
2

Bowler, Michael, Giuseppe Guzzardi and Enzo Rizzo . The Great Book of Automobiles. New
York: White Star, 2004. 35.
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International Labor Organization. The crisis and the future of the automobile industry: Putting the
spark back into the automobile industry. 1 August 2009. 5 June 2012
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billion for GMAC, and $1.5 billion for Chrysler Financial.4 Kimberly Amadeo, President
of WorldMoneyWatch.com, gave the reason for this in her published article, The Auto
Industry Bailout – Why GM, Ford and Chrysler Asked For Government Loans. She
thinks the purpose of the government subsidies was to provide operating cash for GM and
Chrysler, and to keep auto loans available for car buyers even though many opposed the
bailout. She claims the U.S. automakers brought their near-bankruptcy on themselves by
not retooling for an energy efficient era, thereby reducing their competitiveness in the
global market.5
Besides the US, in Canada the federal and Ontario governments provided the
Canadian subsidiaries of U.S. automakers with 4 billion Canadian dollars ($3.29 billion)
in emergency loans. As the Canadian Prime Minister explained on Dec. 20, 2008, "In
Ontario, we've got thousands of people and their families who rely on the auto industry to
be on firm ground, so they can put food on the table and keep a roof over their heads. ...
No state or province employs more workers, and we're not going to give that up."6
Meanwhile, in Europe and Asia, car manufacturers all got a certain amount of
government subsidies. Government bailouts became a necessary means to ensure many
automotive manufacturers’ survival.
However, government help was not the only solution. The auto industry has today
become a major source of employment worldwide. A recent ILO briefing paper suggests
that in 2004 about 8.4 million people around the world worked in automotive production
4

Amadeo, Timberly. About.com. 28 March 2012. 3 July 2012
<http://useconomy.about.com/od/criticalssues/a/auto_bailout.htm>.
5
Amadeo, Timberly. About.com.

6
Noronha, Charmaine. Canada, Ontario to Provide $3.29 Billion in Automaker Loans. 21 December
2008. 4 July 2012 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/12/20/AR2008122001952.html>.
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(including the manufacturers and component firms): around 2 million in Europe, over 1.6
million in China, 1.1 million in North America, and 750,000 in both Russian and Japan,
as well as smaller but still significant numbers elsewhere. The global workforce total
probably climbed to just under 10 million by the end of 2007, the ILO reports.7 Any
solution must therefore take these workers into account.
Thomas A. Kochan, from the MIT Institute for Work and Employment Research
(US), concurred. “We need more than a financial bailout. The challenge at hand is to
forge a new social contract for the auto industry, to understand the workplace and to
engage workers, employers but also other stakeholders.”8 Barry Bluestone, professor of
political economy at Northeastern University (US), linked this approach with the
necessity of re-examining social relations in the sector, saying: “There is a need for a
fundamental change in what the automotive industry builds and how we build these
products, but also in the social relations between employers and unions.”9 It illustrates
how significantly the automotive unions perform during a crisis, and how important it is
to deal with the relationship between car manufacturers and union workers. The United
Autoworkers’ Union (UAW) in turn points to sacrifices made by the workers, including
modifications to the 2007 collective bargaining agreement negotiated with the company
and to employee benefits. A similar process was undertaken in Canada, where the
Canadian Autoworkers Union (CAW) reached a provisional settlement with the company
for a new collective agreement in May in 2009, as part of the overall restructuring.
According to the article “Automobile Industry Crisis” published in the New York
7

International Labor Organization

8

Noronha, Charmaine

9

International Labor Organization
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Times in 2011, many of the excesses of the past — overproduction, bloated vehicle
lineups, expensive rebates — are gone. Carmakers have shed workers, plants and brands
in order to save their companies.10 The auto industry is on a journey, in other words,
which will move it away from dependence on the gas-guzzling high-emission vehicles of
the past. US President Barack Obama has linked his government’s intervention in the
auto industry with a strategic move to curb fuel consumption. The need for progress in
developing cleaner vehicles and cleaner fuels has also been identified by the global union
federation for the industry, the International Metalworkers’ Federation, in a statement by
its executive committee in February 2009. The ILO briefing paper also said, “The
economic crisis could be turned into an opportunity to reduce the industry’s carbon
footprint and create green jobs. Many measures already adopted by governments favor
investments in more environmentally friendly vehicles.”11 Reuters reported that the
Congressional Budget Office said in a report issued in 2009 that U.S. federal policies to
promote electric vehicles would cost $7.5 billion through 2019. Honda, Toyota, Ford,
Chevrolet, etc. are now all producing all-electric cars and plug-in hybrids, which is part
of the auto industry's solution to reach increasingly stringent fuel economy standards
designed to cut emissions and lessen the dependence on oil.
Previous research on this subject has given a brief picture regarding the crisis,
with many different commentators giving their views regarding a certain firm and its
gains and losses. Other research done in the past has focused specifically on a single
nation and the effects suffered in its market; therefore the framework for this study will
be to cover a broader perspective relative to all sides involved in the crisis. This paper
10

The New York Times. Automotive Industry Crisis. 25 May 2011. 2 September 2012
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/credit_crisis/auto_industry/index.html>.
11
International Labor Organization

8

will try to merge all of the work done by many previous writers, commentators, and
analysts in this field so that it will give the reader a much broader idea of the event and its
causes as well as effects.
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3. Financial Crisis and the Automotive Industry
3.1 Effects of the financial crisis on the auto industry
The automotive industry is among the sectors that was hit the most by the
recession. Demand for cars fell sharply, deepening the economic downturn in major carproducing countries. Because of the strong linkages with other parts of the economy, the
final impact of a shock in the industry on the broader economy was sizable.
The reduction in car sales from mid-2008 to 2009 was magnified by the lack of
access to credit. Econometric estimations indicate that tight credit conditions could
explain more than 80% of the collapse in car sales at the end of 2008 in the United States
and in Canada.12 Indeed, the high cost of credit and the inability to obtain auto loans on
affordable terms prompted buyers to postpone purchases they might have otherwise
made. In addition, the growing average longevity of motor vehicles that has been
observed in recent years may have favored these behaviors.
In 2008, a series of damaging blows drove the Big Three to the verge of
bankruptcy. The financial crisis played a role, as GM was unable to obtain credit to buy
Chrysler. As consumer credit tightened, sales fell sharply. As mentioned, it became much
harder for people with average or poor credit to obtain a bank loan to buy a car. During
2007, nearly 2 million new U.S. cars were purchased with funds from home equity loans.
Such funding was considerably less available in 2008. 13 Moreover, the instability of the

12

Similar financial conditions were found in all G7 countries, except France. In the United
Kingdom and Japan, tight financial conditions were estimated to also influence sales , albeit with a lag. The
historical pattern would suggest that the financial aspects of the crisis affected the automotive industry only
in the first quarter of 2009, but it is likely that adjustment speeds were faster in the current crisis.

13

Dash, Eric. Strategies for Car Shopping in a Time of Tighter Credit. 20 November 2008. 2 August
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job market and individual consumer finances discouraged consumers who already had a
working vehicle from taking on a new loan and payments, which affected almost all
major manufacturers. Therefore, without improvement in the financial markets, there was
little way to provide forward momentum for car sales.
Meanwhile, major car manufacturers had in recent years focused on
manufacturing SUVs and large pickups, which were much more profitable than smaller,
fuel-efficient cars. Manufacturers made a 15% to 20% profit margin on an SUV,
compared to 3% or less on a regular car.14 When gasoline prices rose above $4 per gallon
in 2008, Americans stopped buying the big vehicles and Big Three sales and profitability
plummeted. Robert Samuelson advocated a more consistent energy policy, arguing, “Wild
swings between low and high fuel prices have crippled the U.S. industry by erratically
shifting buyer preferences – to and from SUVs.”15
Louis Uchitelle reported in the New York Times that some 20% of the entire
national manufacturing sector was still tied to the automotive industry. The annual
capacity of the industry was 17 million cars in 2006; sales in 2008 fell to an annual rate
of only 10 million vehicles made in the U.S. and Canada. All the automakers and their
vast supplier network accounted for 2.3% of the U.S. economic output, down from 3.1%
in 2006 and as much as 5% in the 1990s. The car manufacturers can only make a profit
when sales are at least 12 million, the Big Three when sales are at least 15 million.16 By

2012 <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/23/automobiles/23LEND.html?pagewanted=all>.
14
Cloud, John. Why the SUV is All the Rage. 24 Feb 2003. 5 August 2012
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1004283,00.html>.

15
The Daily Beast. How to Bail Out General Motors. 4 November 2008. 6 August 2012
<http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/11/15/how-to-bail-out-general-motors.html>.
16
2012.

Uchitelle, Louis. If Detroit Falls, Foreign Makers Could Be Buffer. 16 November 2008. 7 August
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December 19, 2008, oil prices had fallen to $33.87 per barrel, but the automotive crisis
continued.17
3.2 Cyclicality of the automotive industry

Purchasing an automobile is discretionary spending. Economic activity in the
automotive industry usually moves in line with the overall business cycle, but the
amplitude of the cycle is higher. The volatility of the industry is also higher than that of
the manufacturing industries as a whole.
A high correlation is also found between car sales and private consumption, which
in turn accounts for a large part of total output. The relation seems to be particularly
vigorous in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, and in some smaller
OECD countries (Figure 3-2). It was generally stable in Japan, Italy, and the United
Kingdom, while it declined noticeably in France (Figure 3-1).
Fluctuations in activity in the automotive industry displayed stronger amplitude
than the economy-wide and the manufacturing business cycle (Table 3-1). The variance
of automobile production growth was also larger than the one of business investment
growth. As in the wider economy, the fluctuations appear to have declined since the
1990s in the automotive industry. This is largely due to improved inventory management
techniques and more stable car sales.18

17

Webster, Larry. GM in Crisis—5 Reasons Why America's Largest Car Company Teeters on the
Edge Read more: GM in Crisis—5 Reasons Why America's Largest Car Company Teeters on the Edge Popular Mechanics . 18 November 2008. 8 August 2012
<http://www.popularmechanics.com/cars/news/industry/4292379>.
18
Hauph , David, Annabelle Mourougane and Olivier Chantal. "The Automotive Industry in and
Beyond the Crisis." Economics Department Working Papers No. 745 (2010): 36.
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Figure 3-11 Correlation between private consumption and car sales (Quarter-on(Quarter
quarter growth rates 2000-2009)

Table 3-11 Automobile production is more volatile than GDP and investment
(Standard deviation of quarter-on
on quarter growth rates)

13

Figure 3-22 G7 GDP and automobile production growth (quarter
(quarter-on--quarter growth
rates)

Bundesbank; ISTAT; INSEE; Datastream; OECD Economic Outlook 86
database; OECD, Main Economic Indicators database
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4. Crisis in North America
4.1 Crisis in the United States
4.1.1 General analysis

In 2008, a global recession struck which greatly affected the United States’
economy. This recession had many negative impacts on various sectors of the American
economy. One of the most prominent sectors was the automotive industry. Even before
the recession there were many factors such as declining automobile sales and the
lessening amount of credit present in the business which went on to create a more
disastrous and widespread automotive industry crisis.
Figure 4-1 U.S. auto sales

Source: Bloomberg
[The above figure summarizes a brief picture of the slump in sales in automobiles in the

15

U.S market.]

The U.S government intervened in this matter since it threatened massive job
losses as well as posed the potential for huge damage to the overall manufacturing sector.
The government provided a financial bailout in order to support the companies in
restructuring. Both GM and Chrysler filed separately for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection.
Later on, General Motors emerged as a new firm from the bankruptcy. It was now
majority-owned by the Treasury Department of the United States government. Chrysler
was now owned by the United Auto Workers union as well as Fiat S.P.A. After their
emergence from bankruptcy, they also terminated many of their agreements with their
dealerships; General Motors also had to discontinue many of its brands due to its
bankruptcy proceedings.
Of all the Big Three firms, only Ford survived without entering into bankruptcy
mainly because of a huge line of credit that it got in 2007. This automotive crisis was a
global phenomenon, but the car manufacturers in United States were more affected by
this crisis as compared to any of the other foreign manufacturers.
Currently, all of the major American manufacturers have gone on to increase their
sales as part of their ongoing strategies. This has resulted in some success as they have
recently posted profits regarding their sales figures. As of 2012, the whole of the
automotive industry had succeeded in its recovery efforts up to great extent. General
Motors posted sales of more than nine million vehicles, which is greater than the sales of
Toyota.

16

According to many analysts, the automotive crisis in the United States was made
so much worse mainly because of improper business practices by the big auto comapnies
there, namely the three that have been mentioned. When comparing the big American
firms with other global giants, especially those which originate in Asia, then it can be
seen that the Asian firms were not facing similar problems, even those whose businesses
were situated in the U.S.
One of the main factors which increased the severity of this crisis even more was
the expensive cost of fuel; this was linked to the global oil crisis, which occurred before
the automotive crisis. The rise in fuel prices caused the general consumer to shift in their
demand and they now opted to buy less of the larger vehicles such as pickup trucks or
SUV’s as compared to the other vehicles available in the market, since the larger vehicles
tend to use more fuel.
Another major factor which aggravated the crisis was the considerably high cost
of labor, which was greater in unionized industries. This included salaries, healthcare
benefits, pensions, and other job-related benefits. Management, in an effort to procure
labor peace, granted many concessions to their unions, which resulted in significant
legacy costs as well as uncompetitive cost structures.
Moreover, the total amount of cars being sold in the United States market were
significantly tied up with the credit of home equity lines, with some twenty four percent
of total sales being financed through this way in 2006. When these loans’ availability
dried up due to the 2008 mortgage crisis, sales of vehicles declined drastically, from over
fifteen million in 2006 to just above ten million in 2009.
According to many consumer reports published in 2006, the best cars preferred by
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critics as well as the consumers were of Asian origins. In some reports the favor toward
Asian firms was so immense that the reports considered all of the top ten cars to be from
Asian manufacturers, especially giving credit to the Japanese companies. (Figure 4-2) At
the same time the Big Three American firms were making job cuts. An example of this is
from Michigan which lost eighty three thousand auto manufacturing jobs between the
fifteen year timeline from 1993-2008. Much of this cut was associated with the Big Three
manufacturers.
At the time of the mentioned job cut period, many auto manufacturing jobs were
created elsewhere, especially by the foreign firms in cities such as in Tennessee,
Alabama, Kentucky, North and South Carolina, Texas, Mississippi, and Virginia. The
total number of new jobs was more than 90,000 jobs. This also pressured the local
American car-manufacturing firms in competitive terms.
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Figure 4-2 Average Annual Sales for GM, Chrysler dealerships and their
competitors (2005-2008)

[As can be seen from above, the sales of the Big Three firms were significantly lower as
compared to their rival firms in the United States even before the start of the automotive
crisis.]
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Figure 4-3 Hyundai USA monthly sales: 2008 - 2010

Source: GoodCarBadCar.net
[The above figure shows how Hyundai, which is a foreign manufacturer in the United
States, performed during and after the crisis. It can be seen that foreign firms did well to
cope with the crisis as compared to the local American firms.]
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Figure 4-4 Hyundai U.S. sales growth vs. overall U.S. market growth

Source: GoodCarBadCar.net
[This chart also shows how prominent the foreign car manufacturers such as Hyundai
were in growth which came after the crisis. ]
4.1.2 Industrial data

During the first half of 2008, the total employees in the Big Three firms, including
car-dealers and parts suppliers, totaled at more than one and a half million. When looking
at the entire employment figures related to the automotive industry – including the Big
Three – then the total personnel this industry employed numbered at around 3.1 million
in the U.S, including after-market service businesses. During the crisis, the employment
rate in the automotive industry declined.
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According to the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics the proper breakdown
of workers in the automotive sector until September 2008 was as follows,: repair
operations involved eight hundred and sixty-four thousand personnel, parts
manufacturing involved five hundred and four thousand personnel, wholesale operations
involved three hundred and forty thousand personnel, manufacturing involved one
hundred and fourteen thousand personnel, and dealer operations had 1.2 million
personnel.
Also, some estimated 2 million personnel were relying on the healthcare offered
by the automotive industry, and seven hundred and seventy-five thousand retired
personnel collected their pensions from this industry. General Motors was a leading
employer, directly employing more than one hundred and twenty thousand employees in
the United States.
The hourly wages being given to workers were relatively the same when
comparing the offerings by the Big Three firms and the rest of the automotive industries.
For example, the basic hourly wage earned by any UAW worker working for any of the
Big Three was close to what was earned by any Honda or Toyota worker at their U.S
plants. The average wage for an experienced UAW worker was close to $28 an hour in
early 2008.
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Figure 4-5 Employment in Motor Vehicle and Parts Manufacturing and US Motor
Vehicle Production, Seasonally Adjusted, 2007-2012

2007-2012
Source: United States Department of Labor

[The chart above shows the number of automotive job loss during the recession, which
does not include employees from after-market services.]

For any new worker the rate of hourly wage was close to $14 for an hour,
therefore experience counted significantly here as the senior workers were offered better
pay. A huge cost difference between the U.S. employees working for any firm with
foreign origin and the UAW members came in fringe benefits. Here it should also be
noted that UAW has been regarded as one of the most successful unions in America in
terms of fighting for health benefits as well as generous pensions for its members.
The total compensation is often defined as the total cost of labor afforded by the
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firms, and for General Motors it was close to $70 per hour, while for Toyota it was about
$45 per hour. In this sense the average cost difference that existed between foreign
nameplate firms and the Big Three was about $25 per hour. This difference was
considered to be enormous and impacted all the departments in the firm, especially
wages, pension, and healthcare. “Pay rate should be according to experience of the
employee.”19
Looking at the average annual wages for Big Three’s production workers then it
was estimated to be around $67,500 in the year 2007, and about $80,000 for more skilled
personnel. The overall ratio of retirees to workers varied in the Big Three. For every
active worker at General Motors there were some four retirees calculated until the year
2006, at Chrysler the retirees or dependents numbered around two for a worker, and at
Ford this was somewhere close to one and a half per worker. This data translated as the
cost burden of legacy labor being much higher for General Motors as compared to any of
its competitors.
According to many critics and business analysts, these huge labor costs, along
with other costs such as product development, kept the Big Three firms from developing
any high quality product which was essential for profits as well as for survival in a
competitive environment.
The employees of foreign nameplate firms working in the United States were
mainly non-unionized, whereas the Big Three firms were bound to their workforce
through contracts with UAW. According to data provided by UAW, the total labor costs
represented about eight percent of the entire cost of manufacturing as well as selling an
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automobile in 2006.
Here the great majority of costs came at creating a vehicle and transferring it to its
dealership authority, and preparing it for sales which included engineering, marketing,
design, and executive compensation. Any other related costs were not considered as
either direct or indirect form of manufacturing labor.
In 2005 a story was uncovered by some of the leading news outlets claiming that
the Big Three had paid more than ten thousand idled workers their complete salary and
benefits in a program called the “Jobs Bank.” This program was created during the
UAW’s labor contracts in 1984 with the Big Three, the purpose of which was to provide
protection to the salaries of employees and discourage any sort of layoffs which might be
expected later on. This was a significant point in the contracts between the automakers
and UAW.
Here, the main interest of the union was to save jobs through a plan which
guaranteed pay and other related benefits for the union members, especially those who
were laid off due to any sort of technological progress or any new restructuring in the
plant. In many of the cases the employees were being paid through the Jobs Bank only if
they had exhausted both the company’s and the government’s unemployment benefits.
Many of those employees were later placed in retraining.
Due to the process of Jobs Bank, the American automakers were obligated
through contract to pay some ninety percent of the benefits and union wages to members
of UAW who were not working, even when their manufacturing plants had been closed.
According to this agreement, General Motors would pay out more than two billion dollars
in Jobs Bank payments over a period of four years, Chrysler would allocate some $450
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million for its own program alongside another $50 million which was reserved for
salaried union employees, and for similar purposes Ford had also set aside some $950
million.
According to many analysts, this Jobs Bank program was one of the biggest
problems the Big Three firms faced during the automotive crisis and even before it. This
program gave enormous amount of benefits to workers which resulted in a great deal of
financial capital being badly appropriated; capital that could have been used by the car
manufacturers for many other different things that might have given them a better chance
of survival during the 2008 crisis. For example, they could have opted to invest more in
their car manufacturing technology which was facing stiff competition from its Asian
rivals, or they could have just used their capital to introduce new environmentally
friendly technologies which could have also boosted their image in the general public.
This enormous sum of cash that was allotted in the Jobs Bank could also have
been used in advertising campaigns by the Big Three firms. It is very important to create
a level of confidence between the firms and the consumers by inform consumers about
the qualities of the firm, how it intends to contribute towards the society in general, and
what impact it already has made, all of which can be accomplished through advertising.
Looking at the number of brands held by the American firms. General Motors had
a total of eight brands which were sold in America, which does not include GM’s
overseas brands such as Opel, Vauxhall, Holden, and GM Korea. It liquidated one of its
brands because of bankruptcy. This stands in stark contrast to its rivals such as Toyota,
which has only three brands in the U.S market. “Lesser number of brands is often more
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preferred by big firms.”20
“It is a very well known fact that more brands demand more marketing as well as
product development expenditures,”21 this drives incremental costs which is relative to
competition. According to some analysts, if General Motors could have reduced its
overall brands from eight to three that would have saved them some five billion dollars
on an annual basis. “Reduced brands are also favorable for many other reasons such as
less expertise is required to maintain the business in terms of management and the
common employees.”22
“Less brands give the common people more obvious choices to choose from.”23 If
General Motors had fewer brands then it could have focused more on what the people
demanded and provided them just that. In this way the pressure from the competition
would have been relieved up to a certain extent as well.
Fewer brands would have given General Motors a better chance to survive a
market crash scenario in which consumers’ ability to buy reduced drastically and where
they often tend to sell instead of buying, something very similar to the 2008 crisis.
Therefore this is also the reason that the Big Three suffered massive losses while their
foreign counterparts with fewer brands were able to avoid a similar fate. “A reduction in
the total number of brands demands consolidation or closing from the dealerships which
often tends to change the franchise laws and this is a very expensive process for the
20
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firm.”24 For example, if General Motors was to retire one of its brands like Opel, then this
whole process might have cost them some two billion dollars.
Taking a look at the control and number of dealerships related to the U.S-based
auto manufacturers. Chrysler and General Motors had some ten thousand dealerships
between them alone, which employed an estimated five hundred thousand personnel.
Besides this, General Motors also had many different other small dealership units which
were spread across all of its eight brands. These dealerships were well protected and
properly defined by the state laws, which made them very difficult to close without
having to pay large fees. This made dealership reform challenging barring some sort of
bankruptcy protection.
Looking at the bondholders, General Motors was carrying some forty three billion
dollars worth of debt burden on itself. This also came with nearly three billion dollars in
interest per year on its debt. If the bondholders could have swapped the stakes for equity,
which does not pay any interest, then General Motors’ overall interest as well as debt
burden could have been reduced greatly. “Reducing the debt burden is necessary for any
firm in order to achieve better targets.”25
However it was also a fact that the bondholders of General Motors and Chrysler
completely rejected any offer of debt swap, complaining that it provided unequal
treatment to them as compared to UAW. They cited that their overall debt was more than
twice that of UAW’s healthcare trust. In this scenario, UAW would have been offered
some fifty to forty percent stake in the newly formed Chrysler and General Motors
24
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respectively, whereas the bondholders would have just gained 33 cents per dollar for
Chrysler and ten percent stake in the new General Motors. With the approval of U.S
Treasury, the original offer for the bondholders was later on amended in order to include
a further fifteen percent stake.
The bondholders also complained that the United States government had
interfered in matters, which had bypassed the bigger precedence of claims by the debt
holders in favor of the UAW due to UAW’s political contributions to the President of the
United States Barack Obama. There were even cases where the President openly accused
the bondholders of Chrysler for being speculators. This happened after they rejected the
final offer from the government which in turn made Chrysler file for bankruptcy. A
General Motors bondholder described this situation as comparable to a socialist state and
said that he had not expected this sort of reaction from the government at all.
Some bondholders of Chrysler claimed to receive death threats after the judge in
the bankruptcy case rejected a claim to protect the bondholder’s anonymity. The hedge
funds involved said that their clients varied widely, including university endowments and
pension funds. Somewhere around seven billion dollars worth of General Motors bonds
were held by the so called “Mom and Pop-type investors.” One lawyer assessing the case
described this scenario as common retirees versus autoworker retirees.
Unsurprisingly, any recapitalization effort would have completely cleared out the
value of any existing common stock shares, which had already declined very
significantly.
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4.1.3 Impact on the economy
“The automobile industry is a very important component in the overall American
economy.”26 Many economists used the data related to this industry that was observed in
the years 2007 and 2008 in order to make estimates about how a meltdown would
actually play out in the summer of 2008. This was also done to set proper benchmarks
which could help the policymakers to understand the proper effect of bankruptcies.
“Bankruptcy of a business also affects heavily on its related businesses.”27
These, alongside many other estimates, were greatly discussed by the
policymakers during late 2008. Many topics were discussed such as what if the Big Three
were to shut down. In that case it was estimated that the automotive industry would lose
about quarter of a million jobs which were categorized as highly paid ones. Furthermore
a loss of about a million highly paid jobs was estimated at the local dealers and suppliers
end, plus the loss of over one and a half million additional jobs, which were related to
different other sectors of economy. “More often the victims of job losses are the less
experienced workers.”28
A total estimate when combining all of these job losses put the total tally at close
to three million in job losses. Other estimates calculated that the shutdown of the Big
Three firms would cause a great decline in the national personal income level, which
would occur by some one hundred and fifty billion dollars in the first year and some four
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hundred billion dollars over the next three years. Many economists also concluded that if
Chrysler and General Motors were to disappear completely then there could be an
increment of about a million imported vehicles every year, enough to remove some
twenty five billion dollars from the American economy. It would also reduce the GDP by
about 0.2 percent on an annual basis.
Figure 4-6 General Motors stock prices (10/15/07-5/29/08)

Source: Marketoracle.co.uk
[The above graph shows the impact of the automotive crisis on the prices of stock of
General Motors. It clearly shows how much negative effect the firm suffered, not just
because of a lack of public interest in buying vehicles but rather through the
mismanagement from the top level which went on to cause such a crash in prices.]
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Assessing, some of the claims which asserted that any failure would not be a
threat to the economy, in the later half of 2008, some investment managers claimed that if
the key automakers, especially the Big Three firms, were to shut down completely then
many of the foreign firms such as Toyota and Honda would find it easy to set up new
plants in America. This process would not create any long-term loss to the economy
especially concerning the employment sector related to the automotive industries.
Some analysts also stated that any giant corporation failing may be a threat for the
auto industry in general, but it was better to liquidate the firms completely rather than
keeping them up artificially in the hope of any improvement expected in the future. In
this scenario, those who presented their perspectives compared the 2008 crisis to the
dismantling of Daewoo in South Korea during 1999. The impact of the decision to
dismantle Daewoo on the South Korean economy was much greater than that by the Big
Three automaker firms in the United States. “In troubled times, firms often tend to focus
on help from the government’s treasury.”29
Focusing on the Korean example, the overall belief that Korean conglomerates
especially Daewoo, were just too huge to fail caused many of the investors and bankers to
waste their money continuously in bailouts, despite their overall poor business plans and
numerous unprofitable projects. The result of this was that Daewoo was not able to pay
off its loans. “Selling of assets is a common practice for any firm facing financial
crisis.”30
Once this perception that bigger firms were immune to failure was dispelled,
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many large conglomerates were no longer considered to be safe for investments.
Therefore the investors and bankers started creating new opportunities in those areas
which had been starved for capital in the past such as small firms and entrepreneurs. “No
firm is immune from collapse.”31
This caused the Korean GDP to actually recover better than expected after the
unwinding of Daewoo. Another similar example comes from Japan during the decade of
1990’s, where the banks allowed their funding to flow into the unprofitable firms in order
to keep them alive. They also argued that those firms were just too huge to fail. “Failure
of big firms often tends to bring mass unemployment.”32 However, many of those firms
were greatly debt-ridden and therefore required much more in order to survive than just
bailout funds. Many economists in Japan described this process the nation’s “loser
paradise.” It was also seen that the Japanese economy properly recovered only after this
paradise period ended. “High debt is often the main cause of any firm’s demise.”33
Many industry experts, media commentators, and academics made a number of
recommendations concerning the restructuring as well as reforming of the Big Three
firms. These recommendations included introducing a method of court-supervision,
which could assist in reorganizing the firms. Although a court process is considered to be
very lengthy, it often provides the best possible solution for all of the stakeholders
involved. Moreover a court process often tends to have the backing of the federal
government, especially in this case where the firms had relied so much on the
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government that it should have been a choice worth more focus for all the parties
involved.
Other reorganizing processes included allowing the public to have more stake in
the firms which were heavily affected because of the crisis. Although this process might
bring some capital from the general public, it is still far from attaining success as the
people may show hesitance in taking stake in such firms when those firms are deemed so
fragile by numerous open sources such as media outlets. “The failing of any big firm can
result in massive unemployment in related sectors as well.”34
4.1.4 Alternatives to bankruptcy

The bankruptcy-related topics are centered on the code of conduct known as
Chapter 11 ; this is also known as restructuring and is commonly used in giving a
glimmer of hope to a corporation. This involves renegotiating contracts, selling the assets
or other related components of business for the sake of attaining cash, obtaining
forgiveness in debt, or just a general reform within the corporation.
The alternative to the Chapter 11 is known as Chapter 7. This is put into use in
order to liquidate or shut down any firm or to sell its components. The proceeds attained
through Chapter 7 go to the debt holders. In both of the mentioned processes, the
shareholders usually lose their investments and the control of the corporation is given to
the debt holders of the corporation. During the automotive crisis of 2008 it was often
debated as to which chapter to apply in order to address the crisis. Chapter 11 was
ultimately thought to be a more feasible choice.
There are many arguments in favor of Chapter 11. According to analysts this
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would have made the automotive industry more sustainable as well as competitive; the
airline industry was given as an example in this case. Chapter 11 was also thought to
allow the city of Detroit to fully reorganize its job market, which was feared by many to
be about to go through immense losses. “Job markets go through immense jolts when a
big firm collapses.”35
Many opponents of a bailout for the auto industry thought that the problems of
automakers could be resolved in a better way through bankruptcy court, which involves
authorizing legal rights to dissolve any existing contracts and shedding the costs and any
debts which the firm can not afford any more. The downside is that “court proceedings
tend to take a lot of time.”36
The opponents also suggested that complete control of the government over the
car industry would be ineffective in solving the problems since the overall actions of the
industry could be influenced by official governmental policies. Many politicians
supported the bankruptcy procedure as compared to the federal government’s aid to the
automotive industry, but none proposed any solid solution to the problem which was
acceptable to all of the parties involved in the crisis.
The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds which were introduced by the
United States government in 2008 involved the purchase of assets as well as equity from
the leading financial institutions in order to strengthen the financial sector. This was
signed into law in October 2008. It is important to mention TARP because many
commentators as well as politicians supported this program as a way to help the
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automotive industry.
Critics of Chapter 11 argued that as a restructuring process the consumers would
be rather unwilling to purchase any vehicle from the bankrupt automaker, since the
ability of automakers to support their warranty is the main thing which affects consumers’
decision to purchase . Advocates have noted that either the private lenders or the
government could have created a fund which would have enabled warranty coverage.
General Motors argued that a bankruptcy procedure could threaten jobs as well as
the solvency of the American federal government’s pension programs such as Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). The Director of PBGC said that General Motors
had failed to provide an answer related to the funding status of its pension plan. The
pension funds of General Motors were thought to have enough cash for its related
obligations but some reports suggested that the pension could be under-funded by some
$18 billion by the end of 2008. “Pensioners often face cuts when a firm goes into any
financial trouble.”37Chapter 11 bankruptcy is defined as prepackaged when all of the
important stakeholders have agreed on what would happen during the proceedings of
bankruptcy; this enables them to have much more certainty regarding any outcomes as
well as less time spent in bankruptcy protection. Many advocates indicated that this form
of prepackaged bankruptcy is often more preferable, while its critics argued that it was
very unlikely that all the relative stakeholders could agree on the given terms while
staying outside of bankruptcy.
A government facilitated solution was advocated by the Brookings Institution in
which the assets of Big Three firms were to be transferred or sold to some other
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corporation which was considered to be better in deploying employee and plant
resources. The Brookings Institution further stated that the government in this scenario
could play a very productive role by providing short-term infusion of capital alongside
strict repayment rules, which would require the automakers to give away or sell their
overall assets to other more successful firms.
In the statement it was also argued that the cars made by the Big Three were not
entirely preferred by the American public. This problem could not be solved through
means of bankruptcy restructuring which is focused initially on considerations related to
cost-side like benefits and wages. “Job related benefits are often cut when a firm faces
any financial crisis.”38
Another key notion advocated was that the private industry should create a
partnership alongside government that can transform the entire automotive industry; this
could be done by creating a so-called “high mileage vehicle economy” that is based on
fuel cell and hybrid cars whose features includes less carbon emission and more mileage
for the general consumer who utilizes it. “Investment in technology keeps ahead in
competition.”39
The loans for such a project were sought on an urgent basis alongside
conditioning. This notion also included a U.S strategy for creating an automotive
technological leadership that would greatly improve the energy, climate, and national
security, and the overall American global competitiveness. “Technology can be a very
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important factor in any competitive environment.”40 There were also many arguments
presented against government intervention in which some sources stated that by bailing
out the failing firms, the government was confiscating capital from the productive
sources of economy and providing it to the failing ones. By helping the firms with
unsustainable or obsolete business models, the federal government prevented their
resources from being completely liquidated and should have instead made it available for
other firms which could have put those resources into better and more productive use.
“A very essential element of a growing a free market is that the successes as well
as failures should be allowed to happen whenever they are earned.”41 Therefore through
the process of bailout which involves the resources given from the failing firms rather
than to the successful ones, this natural procedure is reversed.
In December of 2008, a prominent opinion column stated that there was no
bailout present for horse and buggy industries some hundred years ago when cars were
replacing them, and that the standards of living overall are now greater because the losers
and winners were determined at that time by the consumers rather than the politicians.
The writer of this column also blamed the gradual decline of the Big Three firms on the
economic policies adopted by some states. It also argued that the Japanese car
manufacturers preferred to build their plants in those U.S states whose policies were not
as hostile as some other ones.
In 2009, Ernst & Young reported that the policies which protect companies can
cause reduced incentives for many entrepreneurs to invest in their innovative ideas and
for any large corporation to invest in R&D because they do not face any competitive
40
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pressure which can help them to constantly improve their produced items. This pressure
is very essential for them to maintain or improve their share in market. “Firms should
invest appropriately towards R&D.”42
Many critics also urged the U.S government to remove the senior management of
the Big Three firms, especially that of General Motors. Their main reasoning for this was
that such removals are very typical in any bailout procedures. In terms of mergers, if two
or more firms from either the Big Three or any other crisis-impacted firms were to merge
then that could have allowed a great deal of cost savings, as well as more focus being
given to the more profitable brands.
However, the UAW opposed any such move as it may have involved a great deal
of layoffs. Chrysler and General Motors held many meetings regarding the merger
process, which went on towards no concrete results. There are many points which are
associated with the failure of the merger such as the agreed share of resources among the
firms, the proportion of layoffs in both firms and so on. “Mergers often result in layoffs
rather than hiring.”43
The automotive crisis in the U.S can be compared to the scenario faced by British
Leyland during the decade of 1970’s; at that time the British firm had some thirty-six
percent of the total market share in U.K. Because of the crisis the British government
nationalized as well as invested many billions of pounds in the troubled business which at
that time was facing a great deal of competition from its European counterparts.
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“Nationalization of a firm often tends to shrink its productive capacity.”44
British Leyland was also facing many questions regarding the quality of its
products and therefore this also caused great problems for its ability to compete in an
ever-competitive environment. In this instance, the firm reduced its product line and
focused greatly on its profitable ventures, which were the Rover and Austin brands.
Afterwards, in the 1980’s, the firm had some relative success in terms of models like the
Austin Metro.
4.1.5 The review of the bailout processes

In late 2008, a U.S senate hearing took place on the topic of the automotive crisis,
which included the presence of the management of Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler.
The heads of the Big Three firms explained that they required the financial assistance of
some twenty-five billion dollars in order to avoid bankruptcy. At the hearing, the Senate
was divided on many points in the overall issue.
In this case the Republican senators were not willing to give any sort of aid; some
of them even desired bankruptcy as the best possible option since it would then free the
auto manufacturers from their employment deals with the unions. At the same time the
Democrats wanted action must be taken sooner rather than later which was in line with
then President Elect Barack Obama’s stance regarding the matter.
A senior officer from the Big Three firms was quoted as saying that there might
be a job loss of more than three million inside the first year of the crisis if the automotive
industry failed. He also said that it is about much more than just Detroit. The main aim
here should be to save the U.S economy from any catastrophic meltdown which may
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result from such losses.
In November 2008, the shares of General Motors fell precipitously to their lowest
level since the last century’s Great Depression on the rumor that any hope of a bailout
had diminished. Shares of other car manufacturers such as Ford also fell greatly.
However, the prices of these shares recovered later on due to the rumors about bipartisan
progress regarding a bailout. In the same month, an article in the Detroit Free Press
claimed that the UAW was thinking about ending their Jobs Bank program as a condition
regarding the federal bailout.
The leading Democratic Party leaders sent letters to the Big Three firm’s CEOs,
calling on them to produce a credible restructuring plan by December 2008 which would
involve significant sacrifices as well as major changes in the ways they conducted their
businesses if they wanted to expect any assistance from the government. The letter also
included different requirements for the different forecasts under various assumptions,
situation assessments, taxpayer protections, executive and dividend pay restrictions,
transparent reporting towards an oversight body, and various other approaches which
were involved in covering the pension and healthcare obligations.
In December 2008, the Big Three firms submitted to Congressional leaders their
revised plans which included many drastic measures like lowering the pay of executives,
an overall reduction in the total number of brands, and the refinancing of company debt.
After this assessment it was estimated that the total bailout funds required by the firms
had now increased to more than thirty-four billion dollars. The auto firms also added that
if help was not provided quickly then things might get worse and the sum of total funding
might increase even more.
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Chrysler argued that it required seven billion dollars by the month’s end just to
stay operational, whereas General Motors requested four billion dollars immediately. In
an interview, President Obama said that the last thing he wanted to see happen was for
the auto industry to completely disappear. He also said that he was concerned that the
government did not want to put tens of billions of dollars into the auto industry only to
have the firms ask for more later on.
In the same month, the negotiators for the Congressional bailout revealed the
terms of a deal which was emerging between the Congress and the White House,
according to which a fifteen billion dollar short-term bailout for the Big Three firms
would be overseen by a federal trustee. The Committee for House Financial Services
released a copy of the then proposed package for financial bailout for the Big Three
firms.
This bill proposed an appointment of a trustee to oversee the restructuring efforts
of the automakers, put restrictions on the bonuses received by the executives of the firms,
reduced golden parachute packages, and demanded the automakers divest or sell any of
their privately leased or owned aircraft. “Management of a firm should be an example to
its employees in terms of living a simple lifestyle.”45
However the bill failed to pass on December 11, 2008. A statement issued by
General Motors expressed its great disappointment regarding this failure; they stated that
they would assess all of their options to carry on with the restructuring and to determine a
means of getting through the economic crisis. Chrysler stated that it was greatly
disappointed by the rejection of the bill but that it would continue to pursue any workable
solution that was essential for the future of the firm.
45

Pressman, Steven. Interactions in Political Economy. New York: Routledge, 1996. 4-5.

42

On December 19, 2008, President George W. Bush publicly announced that he
had given approval to the bailout plan; this would help in providing loans of more than
seventeen billion dollars to the American carmakers Chrysler and General Motors. He
also stated that under the current economic conditions it was necessary to allow the
American auto industry to have the funds and that if this was not done then an immediate
collapse of the entire auto industry was inevitable, and therefore everything must be done
in order to avoid it.
George W. Bush provided some thirteen billion dollars on an immediate basis,
followed by a pledge of four billion dollars through February 2009. These funds were to
be available through the Emergency Economic Stabilization act of 2008. In total,
Chrysler would get four billion dollars, and General Motors would receive more than
nine billion dollars.
However, it was also argued that the U.S Treasury lacked the proper authority to
direct the funds received from TARP towards the automakers because TARP was limited
to provide help to a selected number of financial institutions which the federal
government desired to bail out. This was stated under TARP’s Section 102. Another point
of argument here was that the usage of TARP’s funds towards the automakers was
something which went against the wishes of Congress since Congress itself issued those
limitations helping only a selected number of financial institutions.
This debate was later laid to rest when on December 19, 2008, President George
W. Bush used his powers to declare that the funds associated with TARP could be spent
the way he personally directed, thereby declaring Section 102 to be void.
The loan provided by the federal government would help General Motors avoid
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going into immediate bankruptcy. The loans required the automakers to greatly
restructure their overall operations and to show long-term viability. Later on during the
administration of President Obama in February 2009, the government would assess the
progress made by the automakers according to the conditions set by the loans.
If the given conditions were met, then and only then would the federal
government be liable to provide more aid or to force the firms to repay their loans and
face bankruptcy. It was decided that the loans provided by the government would have a
five percent interest rate but this could increase up to ten percent if the automakers
defaulted on their payments and any concession towards them was not preferred.
During the Obama Administration, a proposal of so-called “car czar” was widely
considered but later abandoned mainly because of a proposed second round of lending for
the automakers. Around mid-February 2009, the automakers Chrysler and General
Motors did apply for additional funds. President Obama’s task force related to the auto
industry was created in the same month of February, and it began to hold meetings soon
after its formation. “Monopoly in any business often leads towards unfair practices.”46
On February 18, 2009, Chrysler and General Motors again approached the federal
government regarding having a second loan worth $21.6 billion.47 In this case Chrysler
would get five billion dollars while the rest of the funds would be allotted to General
Motors. According to General Motors, it agreed to shed off forty-seven thousand jobs,
liquidate twelve car models, and close five of its plants as a part of its restructuring
process.
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Chrysler agreed to eliminate three thousand jobs, slash an entire shift from the
production line, and liquidate three of its models. General Motors was also considering
whether to sell off its Swedish subsidiary known as Saab, but it did not mentioned any
plan for what to do with its British subsidiary Vauxhall or the German subsidiary Opel.
Chrysler applied for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on April 30, 2009, after its talks with
its lenders broke down. The next month on May 15, Chrysler announced that it planned
to shut down twenty-five percent of its entire American dealerships, as related to its
restructuring process. Only few days after approaching the American federal government
for help in seeking funding, General Motors published severe losses of around ten billion
dollars during the final three months of 2008. This brought the entire losses of General
Motors to more than thirty billion dollars.
Adding to this data, during 2007 General Motors suffered losses worth thirtyeight billion dollars. In accordance to its published losses General Motors conceded that
it desired the auditors to raise concerns about its viability in the future when it intended to
publish its annual report due in March. All of this was a way of saying that the firm was
going through a severe crisis in which it did not have many options as to what to do.
In June 2009, General Motors applied for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, due to its
failure in successfully negotiating deals with the bondholders. General Motors became a
largely nationalized firm on the day on which the application for bankruptcy was made:
the American government owned sixty percent of it and the Canadian government owned
some twelve percent.
The employees owned the remaining stakes in the firm. An application in a New
York court marked the failure of General Motors as the biggest ever-industrial demise in
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American history. The firm also announced that it would shut down nine more of its
plants as well as idling three. Its chief executive made an appeal to the customers to give
the firm another opportunity, claiming that the General Motors which had let everyone
down was now gone. “Consumer satisfaction is the key for a firm’s success.”48
In May 2009, a news article claimed that some seven to eight weeks after
President Obama’s administration dismissed the CEO of General Motors G. Wagoner Jr.
he had yet to receive some twenty billion dollars worth of severance package which the
firm had contractually promised him. In February 2009, an article reported by CNN
claimed that the bailout process had cost the American taxpayers around $130 billion.
This news created huge unrest among the general public. Many protested and
demanded that their money be spent on other, more justified causes. Many critics also
argued that funding the bailout process was like throwing the money in a bottomless pit
in which it had no chance of any return on the investment and that the funds could have
been allotted for better purposes rather than giving it to the failing car giants. This also
created great problems for the newly elected Obama administration as it feared a drop in
its approval ratings.
As of June 2009, according to various sources the Obama and Bush
administrations had spent more than eighty billion dollars on the automotive industry. In
May 2011, Chrysler reported that it had repaid the money to the Canadian and American
treasuries, much earlier than when it was supposed to.
With the government bailout, US car sales rebounded after 2009.
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Figure 4-7 U.S. car sales growth

Source: Waverly Advisors
[The figure above shows the recovery in automobile sales in the US.]
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4.1.6 Dealing with the fallout
One of the main things which greatly concerned the auto manufacturers was their
public image and how the crisis affected it. In December 2008, General Motors
introduced a new advertisement in which the firm apologized to the public for violating
the consumer’s trust as well as disappointing the consumer. They also promised to make
future commitments to regain focus on the key brands and move away from the usual
SUV’s and pickups. The firm declared that it needed to make such a statement because it
was deemed necessary as the mainstream media was continuously providing a grim
picture regarding GM and their role in the crisis. “Positive public image is essential for
the success of any business.”49
According to various news media outlets, the CEO’s of the Big Three who
attended the Congressional hearing on November 19, 2008, in Washington D.C in order
to request a bailout for their firms traveled to the destination by the means of their own
private luxury jets. An article on CNN on November 19 said that many Senators as well
as other representatives argued that it was very difficult to provide financial assistance to
the automakers when their CEOs tend to have such a luxury lifestyle even amid such a
crisis.
For many these careless actions taken by the corporate representatives set a clear
tone which was becoming immensely unpopular among the rest of the public as well as
the government itself. The House Speaker issued a statement that until the car
manufacturers showed a viable and working plan, the House simply could not give them
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the capital which they desired. The House Speaker also demanded that the automakers
submit more convincing turnaround plans by early December of 2008.
Another article which appeared on CNN in November 2008 quoted the president
of a well known non-profit firm saying that the CEO’s were arriving in Washington in
order to beg the common taxpayers to help them out, yet it was completely unnecessary
to make the trip via a flight which cost twenty thousand dollars whereas the same
distance could have been covered using a mere five hundred dollar travel arrangement.
Though some critics argued that it was not known if the original cost for the CEO’s trip
was actually twenty thousand dollars, but rather a estimation, in response to all of these
criticisms, in December 2008 it was reported that many of the top CEO’s of the leading
firms had decided to sell off their corporate luxury jet fleets to create a better public
perception about them.
For the December 2008 hearing, all three of the CEO’s of the Big Three firms
choose to drove separately to Washington. For this purpose they chose the latest vehicles
in hybrid electric technology because of the fierce criticism they had faced when they
arrived in their personal jets for the previous month’s hearing.
From the perspective of a common person, the Big Three firms had an extremely
negative view regarding energy conservation. The sections of the American consumers
which are greatly concerned regarding ecology have little or no sympathy for the
background of the big automaker firms. Here the public tends to accuse them of
profiteering and deliberately destroying the system of mass-transportation as well as the
privately-owned railways during the decades from the 1920’s to the 1960’s. Many have
even alleged the Big Three firms contributed towards the development of suburban areas,
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which are seen as greatly fuel-inefficient in the sense that it requires the common
commuter to drive into the city from the distant suburbs. In the early 1920’s when
General Motors faced an extremely saturated car market, it engaged into a controversial
policy alongside the road-builders which triggered a great shift from a system of mass
transportation to the personal car. “Big firms tend to have lobbyists to pursue the
government in their aid.”50
In December 2008, Fitch Ratings downgraded the Issuer Default Rating for
General Motors; Chrysler was also downgraded to C, which indicated that its default was
imminent. An article in the same month from Bloomberg reported that Ford and General
Motors had their overall debt cut much below the investment status by Moody’s and
Standard & Poor’s investor services.
The debt of General Motors was considered to be extremely insecure and was
downgraded by one level to C; it was eleven grades below the proper investment quality
which is set by Standard & Poor’s. Moody’s downgraded its rating of Ford to Caa
because of twenty-six billion dollars of Ford debt, nine below the proper investment
quality.
The Big Three firms spent some fifty million dollars on lobbying Congress in
2008’s first nine months alone. Over his thirty years in Congress, Senator Carl Levin
received almost half a million dollars. House member John Dingell received almost one
million dollars over his fifty-four years in Congress. House member Joe Knollenberg
received about nine hundred thousand dollars over sixteen years in office. Dingell’s wife
Debbie worked as a leading lobbyist for General Motors; she also became a senior
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executive
utive at General Motors with an undisclosed salary. Until May 2008, stock owned by
the Dingells in General Motors was estimated at around three hundred and fifty thousand,
alongside stock options of around one million and a pension fund. The value of this
stock, pension and options was lost because of the bankruptcy restructuring which
Congress approved for General Motors.
General Motors sent many letters to its vast number of supplier executives,
dealers, union members, and employees, asking each and ever
everyone
yone of them to write to
Congress and inform them about the many points which might show up as potential side
effects of the bankruptcy which it might face. In June of 2009, a bill was introduced
which argued that the government should distribute the stock
stockss of Chrysler and General
Motors to each and every individual taxpayer, however it failed to pass.
Figure 4-88 Planned GM dealership reduction pre
pre- and post-bankruptcy
bankruptcy

[The above figure describes the dealership reductions made by General Motor’s prepre and
post-bankruptcy.]
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4.1.7 Reform proposals
After much criticism, the Big Three’s CEO’s went to Washington D.C for the
December 2 Congressional hearing on hybrid cars. This was i a part of their new national
strategy involving a turnaround procedure which would help them win back the
confidence of the general public. Their initial plan was to commit more towards electric
vehicle and fuel-saving technologies and then to present long-term viable plans assuring
their dedication towards solving the crisis in front of the Congressional committee.
Ford unveiled its aggressive plan which involved the electrifying of its vehicles.
This included plans to introduce a van-type vehicle which would be completely electrical.
This would be complemented by a battery powered sedan launched in 2011. By 2012,
Ford also intended to bring a wide variety of plug-in hybrids, regular hybrids, and battery
electric vehicles into the market. These vehicles also tend to be relatively cheaper so
more and more consumers can buy them.
Ford wanted to invest about fourteen billion dollars in fuel-efficient technologies
during the course of the next several years and therefore aimed to achieve a target of
thirty-six percent improvement in fuel related economy for its entire fleet by 2015, which
it set as a target year. “Fuel efficiency in automobiles is one of the key things the
consumer takes interest in while buying.”51
Ford also intended to pursue many other programs through which it intended to
use to develop various technologies; for these purposes it allotted five billion dollars. At
the same time, Ford sought up to nine billion dollars in bridge loans.
GM was also involved in a greatly publicized effort to launch its own hybrid
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model plug-in vehicles, unveiling its production version of the Chevy Volt. This vehicle
has the capability to travel up to forty miles in its electric mode. GM also intended to
employ the drive train of the Volt in its other vehicles. GM laid out many different plans
for launching a fleet of predominately fuel-efficient cars as well as crossovers over the
next three to four years. This would involve investing some three billion dollars in
technologies related to fuel-efficiency as well as alternative fuels. “Strategies should be
planned by keeping in mind the current trends in the environment.”52
It planned to offer fifteen varieties of hybrid vehicles by the year 2012, when
about half of its entire fleet would be composed of flex-fuel vehicles able to run on
ethanol-rich E85 or gasoline.
GM sought twelve billion dollars in terms of bridge loans throughout 2009. It also
asked for a credit of six billion dollars, which it could draw on in case the forecasted sales
fell short. It ended the third quarter of 2008 with reserves of cash of about sixteen billion
dollars, and according to its estimates in July 2008 it needed a minimum of eleven to
fourteen billion dollars on hand in order to maintain its overall operations. Without any
federal loans, the firm expected its reserves to fall to the level of ten billion dollars by the
end of year and to three and a half billion dollars by February of the next year.
Chrysler predicted that for its 2009 model year, some seventy-three percent of its
total vehicles would be better in terms of fuel efficiency as compared to their 2008
models. The company also intended to launch many new smaller and fuel-efficient cars in
the future. Its plan also included the introduction of a hybrid Dodge Ram by 2010
alongside its first ever electric-drive vehicle. Chrysler also had further plans of launching
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an additional three electric-drive vehicles by the year 2013.
Just like General Motors, Chrysler also planned to make half of its fleet flex-fuel
capable by 2012. For this the company sought a bridge loan worth seven billion dollars. It
ended the first six months of 2008 with around ten billion dollars but was likely to end
the year having only two and a half billion dollars remaining in cash. Here, one major
concern was that it might not make it in the first quarter of 2009 without the loan.
The automakers – especially the Big Three – submitted applications regarding the
retooling of loans worth twenty billion dollars. These loans were needed in order for them
to pay for their various projects which would address fuel efficiency and carbon
emissions. “Firms should invest towards the environment in which they operate, such as
towards less carbon emission or better infrastructure of the surrounding areas if
required.”53
Then, in December 2008, General Motors made an announcement regarding the
temporary closure of its twenty factories in United States. Soon after this announcement,
Chrysler announced that it would also temporarily close thirty of its plants for a period of
one month.
General Motors also had plans to consolidate its portfolio regarding its American
business by concentrating on the Buick, Cadillac, GMC, and Chevrolet brands while
possibly selling or phasing out the Hummer, Pontiac, and Saturn brands. In June 2009,
GM announced that it had sold the Hummer brand to a Chinese firm and that the
complete transaction would close in 2009’s third quarter. Yet a February 2009 article
written in the Herald Tribune claimed that General Motors was about to invest one billion
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dollars in Brazil; it also claimed that the money for this investment came from the bailout
funds which it had received from the American government.
Although this process of selling off brands to other firms was seen as improper
practice by many observers, the fact is that the top car manufacturers had little to no
choice regarding this matter. Critics argued that by this procedure the firms would not
only lose a great share of their market value but would also create a negative perspective
in the eyes of the common consumer which would see this as U.S. jobs being shifted
overseas.
4.2 Crisis in Canada
The auto industry in Canada is closely linked to its American counterpart mainly
because of the agreement known as Automotive Products Trade, which later evolved into
NAFTA (Northern American Free Trade Agreement). Canada has a total of 3,500 car
dealers which provide employment to a total of 140,000 people. Over 22,000 jobs were
lost from 2007 to 2009. Therefore, these dealers informed the federal government in
Ottawa in November of 2008 that they were at a huge risk from the global financial
crisis. Therefore they asked the government to provide help despite the fact that they
recorded huge number of sales that year.
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Figure 4-9 Canadian Auto Employment

Data sources: Statistics Canada/Chart: Reed Construction Data – CanaData

Ottawa considered providing financial aid to the Big Three’s Canadian
subsidiaries as well as to the auto part companies. The auto industry scenario argued that
the guarantees of loans alongside other help would go on to rescue tens of thousands of
auto sector jobs in Canada, which faced a great threat from the huge drop in car sales in
the United States market.
Chrysler Canada specifically asked for a billion dollars in aid, making it the only
one among the Big Three’s Canadian arms to ask for a specific dollar request. Many
industry analysts criticized the labor contracts and the dealings which then-president of
the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW) Buzz Hargrove had with the Big Three in 2007.
There were predictions concerning the subprime mortgage crisis and worries that
resulting currency issues would impact the Canadian auto production units very hard.
It was also noted that the president of UAW in America agreed to have “all-in”
wages for UAW, this caused the pension and benefit costs to experience a significant drop
from the high of $75.86 per hour rate in 2007 to about $51 per hour average rate in 2010.
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Comparing this to the cost per hour rate of CAW, it can be sees that it was $77 in 2007,
which rose to more than $80 per hour at the terminating period of the new contract.
According to analysts, the UAW president went into negotiations with one primary
objective and that was to save jobs, whereas the strategy of CAW was to get every single
dime out of them. “Worker unions should always look after the profit of the firm and the
entire union instead of just few individuals.”54
The current union president in Canada, Ken Lewenza, urged at the time that the
labor union not be held responsible for the bankruptcy problems faced by the Big Three
automakers; he further said that his own members would never make any concessions
despite that being a part of the proposed terms of a bailout funded by the taxpayers.
Lewenza also added that he would not accept any more cuts after having already lost
many thousands of jobs in previous few years. “Job cuts are often feared by the
management since it can result in any form of backlash from the worker unions.”55
Lawenza also said that back in 2007, CAW had agreed to make proper concessions,
which would help the Big Three firms save some nine hundred million dollars over the
next three years.
The Canadian Taxpayers Federation’s (CTF) spokesperson sharply criticized the
“no-concession” stance of the CAW, saying that this would only strengthen the
opposition towards a taxpayer-funded bailout for the Big Three automakers. CTF further
noted that it was very difficult to understand why any person who asked the government
for help would at the same time not want to do anything to contribute towards a solution
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to the crisis event. CTF also stated that the union had failed to properly realize that they
had lived comfortably because of the already substantial largesse offered by the Canadian
taxpayers for many decades. Columnist Kelly McParland suggested that if he didn’t
provide anything then his members – including himself – were more likely to lose
everything. Kelly also stated that the main problem facing the United States auto industry
should be borne equally by labor and management alike. He went on to criticize labor for
building up completely unsustainable benefits and pay for themselves at the same time
attacking management for their short-term strategy and sales tactics.
The proposed bailout of $3.5 Canadian billion for the Big Three’s Canadian
subsidiaries was opposed by the CTF, which suggested that it would result in a great
financial burden for the average Canadian taxpayer, and also would help provide an
excuse for the American automakers to postpone making any large changes no matter
how desired those changes might be outside the auto industry.
CTF noted that the provincial and federal governments spent about seven
hundred and eighty-two million dollars on the Big Three in the previous five years,
comparing that kind of spending to the cash having been thrown into a bottomless pit that
kept on requesting more and more money. Lewenza disagreed with this by saying that
Canadians should see the bailout as a loan, which would be paid back after the economic
crisis was over when the nation’s economy was back on a prosperous track.
In December 2008, the province of Ontario as well as the government of Canada
offered more than three billion dollars in loans to the automotive industry. According to
this plan, General Motors would receive three billion and the rest would be allotted to
Chrysler. (Ford was not participating in the bailout process and it only requested a line of
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credit.)
A cost-cutting deal with GM Canada was negotiated by CAW in March 2009
wherein its current contract was extended by one more year until September 2012. The
deal also allowed for the preservation of the base pay of the average assembly worker at
almost thirty-four dollars an hour. It required eliminating the seventeen hundred dollars in
special bonuses given annually and reduced the overall paid absences to one week for a
year.
The vacation entitlements would be kept as they were, ranging up to six weeks a
year for any high seniority worker. Senior autoworkers from CAW were allowed to keep
ten weeks of their vacation alongside full pay. This was combined with not having to
provide any contribution to their own pension fund and relying on the taxpayers in order
to help making up for their unfunded liabilities . This deal also introduced payments by
the members towards a health benefits plan which included fifteen dollars per month for
pensioners and thirty dollars a month for the family of current workers. Lewenza claimed
that this would also trim by thirty five percent of the firm’s contributions towards the
programs provided by unions like wellness and child care programs. The agreement was
deemed contingent on the Canadian government as it involved allocating some twenty
percent from General Motors of United States as well as getting many billions of U.S
dollars in provincial and federal taxpayer support, primarily in the form of loans.
Lewenza claimed that the package as a whole was a major sacrifice, however
independent observers assessed it somewhat differently. From their perspective the deal
did not go far enough, and an analyst from Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS)
defined it as “not material.” Another prominent automotive firm consultant claimed that
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General Motors had lost a great opportunity to cut labor costs. He noted that since
bankruptcy was an ongoing threat Queen’s Park (the Ontario Legislature) and Ottawa
should have demanded cuts in the labor bill as a condition for the bailout, and that a
deficit towards the pension fund would prevent CAW from striking. There were also
estimates that the average hourly cost of any General Motors Canada worker was seventy
five to eighty dollars including the benefits, such that General Motors got away with
seven or six when it could have cut wages by twenty dollars. “Cuts in wages by the firm
should be properly consulted with the workers union before being applied.”56
Further opinions stated that giving up the increases in cost-of-living were not
prominent sacrifices as inflation was considered to be nearly non-existent, so that a forty
hour decrease in paid time just translated into “five fewer spa days.” A professor from the
University of Toronto calculated that this process would save some one hundred and fifty
million dollars on an annual basis, even as General Motors was seeking six billion dollars
from the government of Canada in support.
In addition, many critics argued that this process would not be a final process in
itself regarding requests from the automakers for a bailout. It was also estimated that
General Motors would go through the loans provided by the government in the next few
quarters, long before any recovery was expected in the market. Even the president of
General Motors Canada admitted that the company had already pledged its entire assets
to the United States government, in order to help secure the first tranche of some thirty
billion US dollars in loans, thereby leaving no other assets to collateralize the six billion
dollar loan from the government of Canada.
The Federation of Canadian Taxpayers noted that somewhere between 1982 and
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2005, about eighteen billion dollars was handed out by Ottawa to different companies,
with only seven billion dollars ultimately repayable and only about one and a half billion
dollars ever repaid. “Taxpayers should have the knowledge about where their money is
being spent.”57
The president of Chrysler, Thomas LaSorda, and the chief manufacturer of Ford,
Joe Hinrichs, noted that the deal between General Motors and CAW was insufficient;
they suggested that they preferred breaking the negotiating pattern of CAW, which was
set by General Motors. Chrysler’s president told the Finance Committee of the Canadian
House of Commons that he would recommend a twenty-dollar hourly wage cut,
suggesting that his firm might even withdraw from the Canadian market if it failed to
achieve more viable cost savings from CAW.
The CEO of Fiat, Sergio Marchionne, had asked that the wages of CAW workers
should be reduced to the non-unionized workers’ levels of Toyota and Honda, which were
operating in Canada, or else they would prefer walking away from a proposed alliance
alongside Chrysler. This would result in Chrysler being forced into bankruptcy. “Mergers
in corporations often tend to bring a better product.”58
In March of 2009, both the provincial Ontario and federal Canadian governments
jointly rejected the restructuring plans submitted by Chrysler and General Motors. This
occurred after the day when American President Obama also rejected the plans offered by
their parent firms. The Ontario Premier as well as the federal Industry Minister in Canada
suggested that the initial deal by CAW was insufficient for cutting costs, therefore the
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union had no choice but to return to negotiations in order to make further concessions just
to show that the taxpayers’ money of would be used in a justifiable manner.
Figure 44-10
10 Canadian Automobileautomotive Output

Source: statistics Canada
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5. Crisis in the European Markets
The automotive industry is the “engine” of the European economy: about one in
ten jobs in Europe depend directly or indirectly on the automotive sector. The industry is
the largest investor in innovation and R&D and a formidable export force. The European
automotive industry generates a turnover of 551 billion Euro, which represents around
6.5% of Europe’s gross domestic product (GDP). The industry directly and indirectly
provides jobs to over 12 million families. The multiplier effect of the 2.2 million direct
employees at vehicle manufacturers and their suppliers is enormous. One job at the
vehicle manufacturer creates four more at suppliers and another five in related sectors
and retail.
The economic recession and financial crisis have had a devastating effect on the
automotive industry with serious implications for the wider economy. For more than a
decade, sales in the EU have stayed within a relatively narrow trading range (16.7m to
17.7m units). Since the summer of 2008, sales decisively dropped through the floor of
this range and crashed further in the final quarter of the year.
By 2009, vehicle sales were running 3.5 million units lower than the trend rate.
This shock, combined with a synchronized crash in key automotive export markets,
brought to reality a beyond worse case scenario, exceeding the pre-crisis planning of even
the most cautious manufacturers. The crash in domestic vehicle sales and in key export
markets was so sharp and so deep that every single manufacturer saw significant cash
burn, estimated at between 18 billion euro and 30 billion euro.
Although the slump in the European market began even before the start of this
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crisis, the events of 2008 exaggerated the losses which were felt heavily even by those
sectors related to manufacturing.
Figure 5-1 Passenger car production in Europe 1990 – 2010

Figure 5-2 Commercial Vehicle Production in Europe 1990-2010

Source: ACEA
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Figure 5-3 New passenger car registration and GDP growth in the EU 1990 - 2009

[The above figure shows a sharp decline in the new passenger car registrations as part of
the GDP growth in the European Union, and e how these two trends are closely
interlinked with each other.]
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Figure 5-4 New commercial vehicle registration and GDP growth in the EU 1997 2009

[The above figure shows the relationship between the sharp declines in both the European
Union Gross Domestic Figures and registrations for new commercial vehicles in the
European Union.]
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5.1 Crisis in Russia
The automotive industry in Russia was impacted greatly by the global financial
crisis especially with regards to the automobile crisis which followed afterwards. This
impact was most severely felt in the production of passenger cars which saw a significant
drop from about 1.5 million units in 2008 to only six hundred thousand units in 2009. The
production of Lorry fell to ninety
ninety-one
one thousand from about quarter of a million during the
same period.
Figure 5-55 New Light Vehicle Sales in Russian, Thousand of Units

The federal government in Russ
Russia
ia introduced some protection measures worth
five billion dollars to improve the overall situation in the auto industry. These funds
included about two billion dollars worth of bailout money for the most troubled firms as
well as three billion dollars wort
worth
h of credit for the buyers of Russian automobiles. Prime
Minister Putin noted that this move was essential for saving Russian jobs.
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Tariffs were increased on foreign trucks and cars by a minimum of a hundred
percent and fifty percent, respectively. These tariffs were associated with the size of the
engine in the vehicles. The increment in duties led to many protests in Russia, especially
in the city of Vladivostok where the import of Japanese vehicles was a key sector of the
overall economy of the city.
To compensate for these losses suffered by the businesses in Vladivostok, the
Prime Minister ordered the auto-manufacturing company Sollers to shift one of its plants
to the city from Moscow. This process was finished in 2009 and the new plant now
provides employment to about seven hundred locals. Furthermore, it was planned that
this plant would produce more than thirteen thousand vehicles in the city of Vladivostok
by the year 2010.
Due to the efforts of the government during the crisis, automotive production
returned to its pre-crisis levels at the end of 2010. Also, some ninety percent of the entire
vehicle models being sold in Russia were produced domestically by 2010; the
manufacturer which topped the list in production was Avtovaz. According to statistics, the
first seven months of 2010 saw increment in the sale of Lada cars by sixty percent, and
KIA also reported an increase of more than hundred percent in sales while Chevrolet also
posted a rise of fifteen percent in its sales.
By 2010, Russia was regarded as the fifteenth largest car producer in the world,
ahead of Poland and Italy. The entire automotive industry in Russia accounts for some
seven percent of the global car production. For example, manufacturers of E-mobile,
regarded as giants in Russian car manufacturing, announced that they would be selling
the vehicle in three distinctive body types, a hatchback, delivery truck and a sedan.
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The firm also announced that most of its vehicle’s components would be produced
in either former Soviet countries or in Russia. The serial production was due to start in
2012 with the intention of selling about ten thousand units during its first year in
production. The price would range between ten thousand to fifteen thousand dollars to
keep it affordable for the middle class in Russia.
Furthermore, the firm producing E-mobile also intended to sell its product beyond
the borders of Russia. One of the biggest hurdles in front of it is the need to come to
terms with the European Union’s regulation policies.
5.1.1 Industry overview

The automotive industry in Russia can be divided into four broad categories,
which are foreign OEMs, local brand producers, local firms producing foreign brands,
and joint ventures. In 2008, there were about fifty-five hundred firms manufacturing
vehicles and their related equipment in Russia, this amounted to a total of 1.5 billion
Rubles in sales production.59
The most popular cars in Russia are commonly the homegrown brands such as the
models of AvtoVAZ. When looking at the total units sold in the year 2009, the Lada
Priora topped the chart with more than eighty thousand units sold. Second was the Lada
Samara with about seventy-eight thousand units sold. Third was the Lada 2105/2107 with
about fifty-seven thousand units sold. The Lada 2105 was thought to see more increase in
its sales due to the car scrappage scheme launched in March 2010, where consumers were
encouraged to trade in their old, poorly-performing vehicles. The fourth best selling car in
2009 in Russia was the Lada Kalina, which sold about fifty-two thousand units.
59
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In recent times, the commercial vehicle sector has seen a surge in popularity in the
GAZelle van, which is manufactured by GAZ. This has occupied a total share of about
fifty percent of the market in 2009 by selling more than forty-two thousand units. Many
leading analysts, critics, and journals declared GAZelle to be the most successful
automobile in Russia in 2009.
There have been several new projects being launched by the Russian automobile
industry in recent years, some of them very ambitious. The Marussia brand, which is
manufactured by Marussia Motors, recently became the first supercar as well as the first
modern sports car produced in Russia.
The Marussia B1 was introduced in December 2008 at Moscow’s New Manezh
Hall. In September 2010, the first Marussia Motors showroom was opened in Moscow;
Nikolay Fomenko, a well-known actor, racer and singer in Russia, heads Marussia. In
2010, the firm gained a significant amount of stake in Formula One’s Virgin Racing team;
this led to the team renaming itself to Marussia Virgin Racing. This also made it the first
Russian Formula One team.
Russian automobile manufacturers also have other ambitious projects such as the
Yo-mobile which is a vehicle that can burn natural gas as well as gasoline. This vehicle
was introduced in Moscow in December 2010 and was a joint venture between the
Onexim investment group and Yarovit, which is a St. Petersburg based manufacturer of
trucks. The project was lead by Mikhail Prokhorov who also was a key financier of this
entire project. He planned to invest about two hundred million dollars in this venture. His
main aim was to counter a common stereotype that good cars cannot be produced in
Russia.
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5.1.2 Key actors

The largest automobile firm in Russia is Avtovaz. It is located in Tolyatti; it has a
current employee workforce of about one hundred and thirty thousand personnel. It is
famous for its Lada models, which dominate sales in the Russian market. Some fifty
percent of the total car production in Russia is accounted for by Avtovaz.
The second biggest car manufacturer in Russia is Avtotor, which is located at
Kaliningrad Oblast. This firm performs many different operations on foreign models such
as CKD, SKS or full-cycle assembly.
This includes performing operations on Kia, BMW, Chevrolet, and Cadillac
vehicles. In 2009, a total of sixty thousand cars were produced by Avtotor, which
accounted for ten percent of the entire Russian car production.
The third largest car manufacturer is Avtoframos, which produced about fifty
thousand cars in 2009. Its manufacturing plant is located in southeast Moscow. It is a
joint venture involving Moscow city administration and France’s Renault, with Renault
holding the majority stake. This firm manufactures the Renault Sandero and Renault
Logan brands. Its ratio regarding Russian-made equipment is fifty-four percent, and this
is expected to increase to seventy-four percent by 2012. The fourth largest carmaker in
Russia is Volkswagen and the fifth is Ford. Summing up the total share of the five biggest
auto manufacturers, they account for eighty percent of the entire cars which are made in
Russia.
Focusing on the heavy vehicle sector, the biggest firm is the KaMAZ truck maker.
It is also regarded as one of the biggest firms in the entire Russian automotive industry.
KaMAZ sold about thirty-three thousand vehicles in 2010, of which some twenty-eight

71

thousand were sold in Russia and the rest to foreign countries.
Another huge firm in the heavy vehicle sector is GAZ; it makes busses, trucks,
and vans among other items. Its most renowned product is the GAZelle van; this has a
total share of forty-nine percent of the light commercial vehicle market. This firm
launched a better version in the year 2009 named GAZelle Business. GAZ occupied a
total market share of seventy-seven percent in the bus sector; it sold slightly more than
six thousand small class busses, eighteen hundred medium class and eleven hundred and
fifty-six large class.
Concern Tractor Plants is Russia’s biggest tractor maker and also one of the
biggest machine-building firms in the world. It is located at Cheboksary. This firm
employs about forty-five thousand personnel.
5.1.3 Social impact of potential bankruptcy

The automotive industry in Russia is a very important sector of the economy; it
employs six hundred thousand personnel as well as supporting two to three million
individuals in related industries. Politically, it has a huge significance on the nation’s
economy. This is due to many factors, firstly because it employs such a huge number of
individuals and secondly because many people in Russia are dependent on social services
which are given by the automotive firms.
Example here includes the AvotVAZ factory located in Tolyatti which is very
important to the entire city. Tolyatti is regarded as a “monotown,” a city that is entirely
dependent on a single firm for its economy. TheAvotVAZ factory provides employment
to around a hundred thousand people in a city where the entire population is around seven
hundred thousand.
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President Dmitry Medvedev inaugurated a program known as the Medvedev
modernization in 2009. This was aimed at diversifying Russia’s raw materials
throughout its energy-dominated economy, with the main purpose to turn the economy
towards modern high-technology based on innovation. After this, the automotive industry
in Russia came under a great spotlight because of its enormous potential for
modernization.
Prime Minister Putin has taken a personal interest in the automotive industry. He
has also made many attempts to give great publicity to the local car manufacturers, such
as participating in the road trip at new Amur Highway during August 2010.
5.2 Crisis in Germany

The automotive industry in Germany was strongly knocked about by the financial
and economic crisis. After October 2008, production levels declined rapidly. Compared
with 2009, passenger cars declined 31% and commercial vehicles decreased 59%.
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Figure 5-6 German passengers car sales, monthly progress year-to-date (thousand
units)

Source: Selective Rationality
The automotive industry in Germany emerged very quickly from the 2008 crisis
mainly due to the rapid rise of exports. The U.S. and China were the main drivers of
those exports. The automotive industry was seen to increase its domestic production as
well as its exports by the end of 2010. “Increasing exports should be one of the main
priorities of the government.”60
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Many critics, analysts and observers compared the auto crisis as well as the entire
financial crisis as the worst problem Germany had faced since World War II. Many of the
automobile giants predicted sharp cuts in their production of vehicles, for example the
CEO of Daimler predicted that its firm would produce 150,000 fewer cars in 2009. BMW
reported having to cut some 8,000 jobs only a few months after the start of the crisis.
Many firms were also fighting for their survival such as Opel, a subsidiary of General
Motors. The German wings of Chrysler and Ford also faced similar situations mainly
because of severe mismanagement at the top level.
Take Daimler as an example. In the period from January to March 2009, Daimler
reported losses of 1.4 billion Euros. Daimler’s responses to the losses included reducing
production at several of its plants, reducing work time and cutting 8.75% of salaries for
60,000 employees, with no bonuses in 2008 for 141,000 employees. To dampen its
financial problems, Daimler inquired about 2 billion Euros from Abu Dhabi strategic
investment fund to exchange for 9% of its share.
Although the problems were enormous, the German auto industry came out of
them. The main reason for this was foreign demand for its vehicles, as the industry places
massive dependence on exports. By 2010, it had succeeded in increasing the exports of its
automobiles by a fifth as compared to previous best-recorded figures, to more than 4.5
million. “Exports are essential for the revival of industries.”61 Domestically, in 2009 the
German Government introduced a scrappage program, which like the Russian progam,
offered consumers 2,500 euros ($3,400) to surrender their old clunkers. It turned out very
effective and helped spur more than 1.3 million new car sales.

Routledge, 2004. 54-55.
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5.3 Crisis in France

The economic crisis in France put those firms which were already in difficulty
into an even more desperate situation. Even those companies previously considered to be
in a relatively good position found themselves in very fragile shape in 2008. Sales of
new vehicles stagnated at 2 million. The new car purchasing power of households
declined significantly.
Figure 5-7 French auto production compared to EU

[Here is a very interesting chart written in French, which shows the comparison of French
auto production with EU production in total in recent years.]
In November 2008, the French manufacturer PSA Peugeot Citroen cited that its
total sales might fall by some 10% in 2009; this was following a 17% drop in its last
quarter sales in 2008. Because of this it planned to cut jobs in various sectors by about
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2,500. In February of 2009, PSA made a new announcement that now it would cut 11,000
jobs throughout the world, however it cited that France would be excepted from these
cuts.
During the 2008 financial year, Renault announced a total profit of about 600
million Euros; this was a significant drop of about 80% from the previous year. Renault’s
sales throughout the world fell by 7% except in Europe, and in the European market it
fell by 4%; this caused it to abandon its previous growth targets for 2009. Although the
situation was grim in the markets, still Renault was one of the few European car
manufacturers to have returned to profit levels soon after the crisis.
The shrinking car market in France is not a new phenomenon. The reduction of
demand had already begun before the crisis. The current crisis did help to reveal how
unsustainable the industry was. At the end of 2008, the French government took some
immediate measures to combat the crisis. The government spent 6 billion Euros, divided
between both PSA and Renault, to support them in “green” car production. The
government also created a fund to modernize auto suppliers since they were equally
weakened by the crisis. The manufacturers’ financial corporations also benefited from
subsidies from the state, allowing them to continue to finance their clients. The state also
created its own strategic investment fund to invest in firms which were threatened by
bankruptcy or acquisition. Also, a scrappage scheme offered 1,000 Euros for vehicles
over ten years of age that were traded in for a new “clean” car. All these measures helped
French automotive manufacturers weather the crisis relatively well.
The 2008 economic crisis revealed problems in the French automobile industry
but it also had some positive outcomes. One was the reversal of the trend from “over-
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quality” to meet buyers’ needs. Another was improving the “social” quality of their
products, to produce smaller, safer and more environmental friendly vehicles.
5.4 Crisis in Italy

In December 2008, Fiat announced that it intended to extend the length of its
plant closures by a month in Italy, where the main plant for the Alfa Romeo cars was
already due to be shut for about four weeks. Fiat also announced in January 2009 that it
faced a nineteen percent drop in its last three month’s revenues of 2008. This issue was so
important to the government that the Italian Prime Minister ordered that he would take
note of this issue with the highest priority. However in February 2009, because of the
actions taken by the Italian government for the stimulation of automotive sector, Fiat
announced that the closure of its plants would be curtailed. It also announced that it
expected a drop of about 14% in its European sales by 2009. In January 2009, the firm
announced an agreement according to which it was subjected to regulatory approval in
order to acquire 35% of Chrysler. This stake by Fiat in Chrysler did not involve any
conventional sale of shares; rather it would be done by allowing Chrysler to properly
utilize Fiat’s fuel-efficient technology.
Chrysler was also given access to the European sales outlets of Fiat, while at the
same time Fiat gained access to the U.S dealerships of Chrysler where it was predicted
that smaller car models like the Fiat Punto would be very successful. Fiat had faced many
troubles in gaining a proper foothold at the U.S markets whereas Chrysler could never
occupy a strong share in the European market.
5.5 Crisis in Spain

Spain today is the eighth largest producer of automobiles. The automotive
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industry is 3.5% of its GDP. In 2008, when passenger car sales fell 28% it marked a
turning point in the recent history of the Spanish automobile industry. In the second half
of 2009 and the first half of 2010, there was an increase in registries and the recovery of
profits, thanks to the government’s direct financial support of the purchase of vehicles.
SEAT, a well-known Spanish automobile manufacturer, announced in October
2008 it was slashing production on its Martorell manufacturing plant by 5% mainly
because of a significant fall in its sales. This decision affected about 700 of its employees.
On other fronts, SEAT was dedicated to investing in many new technologies which could
help reduce the cost of its business operations. These steps included installing solar
panels at its plant near Barcelona.
The development of electric vehicles presented a major industrial, energetic, and
environmental opportunity for Spain. The development of biofuel vehicles has also been
a promising industrial opportunity. The auto companies have also sought the chance to
enter markets like China and India. As a result of these and other measure, when
compared to many of the other European economies, which suffered great losses due to
the automobile crisis, the Spanish manufacturers conceded fewer losses on all fronts.62
5.6 Crisis in the United Kingdom

In the United Kingdom, the Jaguar Land Rover group, which was owned by Tata
Motors sought $1.5 billion in loans from the government so that it could cope properly
with the crisis. On December 2008, Tata declared that they intended to inject many tens
of millions of dollars into the firm, which they had bought from Ford in early 2008. Then
Prime Minister Brown stated that he intended to take a more positive role in solving the
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problems faced by the car industries throughout the U.K.
Nissan announced in January 2009 that it was to cut twelve hundred jobs from its
factory located in the northeast of England, namely Washington, Tyne, and Wear, because
of the global automotive crisis of 2008. Despite being declared as the most productive
and efficient car manufacturing plant in Europe, the firm did not hesitate to make this
announcement.
The British subsidiary of General Motors, Vauxhall Motors, widely regarded as
among the top most-favored brands in the U.K, has a total of two bases in Britain. These
include a factory located at Cheshire and R&D center alongside its headquarters at Luton,
Bedfordshire. There is no proper data available to confirm if the cutbacks made by
General Motors had any effect on these plants. This group, alongside its sister subsidiary,
the Opel brand in Germany, was to be sold to Magna International in their majority.
Magna is an Austro-Canadian firm which supplies car equipment to large automakers;
however, this transaction was later cancelled by General Motors.
Optare, which is a British bus manufacturer, got an order in November 2008 from
Arriva for the creation of more than fifty buses. This contract was estimated to be worth
more than six million pounds and required the creation of five hundred jobs in the
Assembly factory of the firm located at Leeds, West Yorkshire, as well as at the parts
center located at North Lanarkshire. British commercial vehicle and van manufacturer
LDV Group requested thirty million pounds in bridging loans from the British
government in order to proceed with a management buyout; this was later on refused.
LDV had stated that it possessed a bright future and wanted to become the producer of
electric vans if any management buyout were to take place. LDV’s production at its
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Birmingham factory was suspended after 2008 because of poor demands. Later on when
no buyout materialized, LDV folded in October 2009.
Like other countries, the UK government launched a scrappage incentive scheme
in order to support its auto industry. Cars registered before February 29, 2000, were
eligible to be scrapped for a discount of £2000 on a new car, half of which was provided
by the government and the other half by the dealer. This led to 300,000 new car
purchases. In 2010, the government announced a £230 million “plug-in car” grant
scheme to provide a £5,000 grant towards the purchase of plug-in electric cars. An
additional “Plugged-In-Place” scheme would provide some 11,000 charging points in
selected cities over the next three years.
Figure 5-8 British Car Production is Accelerating

Source: SMMT
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Figure 5-9 UK Car Sales 2000-2011

5.7 Measures to cope with the crisis

The European passenger car and commercial vehicle markets were hit hard by the
financial crisis and subsequent economic downtu
downturn.
rn. The credit crunch made it more
difficult for the sector to finance daily operations andalso weakened demand for new cars
and trucks.
The current crisis is thus threefold:
Financially, it has a drastically limited access to credit, and led to high costs
cost of
credits when available for the manufacturers, their suppliers, and for potential buyers of
cars and trucks.
Economically, it has led to a dramatic drop in demand for both passenger cars and
commercial vehicles.
Structurally, it has lowered margins due to an increasingly complex and diverse
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product portfolio and an increasingly pressing demand to adapt manufacturing, logistics,
vehicle and R&D to meet environmental needs.
5.7.1 Measures taken by the EU governments and institutions

It is most essential that EU governments and institutions ensure access to
liquidity, through the European Investment Bank and in other ways.
It is equally vital that governments stimulate demand for new vehicles with fleet
renewal schemes; this will benefit both the economy and the environment.
Fleet renewal schemes can take the form of scrapping incentives and other forms
of market stimulus, for example through fiscal measures. Governments can collect 381
billion Euros in vehicle taxes and have a powerful instrument to influence the market.
The EU should also refrain from adding any new costly vehicle regulations for a
few years.
5.7.2 Measures taken by automotive manufacturers

Production: manufacturers need to adapt their output to deal with the anticipated
decrease in demand of vehicles
Employment: manufacturers should adjust their employment base in an as socially
responsible way possible, using the flexibility agreements at their disposal (extended
vacations, taking weeks out of production, shortening working weeks, non-renewal of
short-term contracts, and non-filling in of vacancies), and in close contact with unions
and governments.
Cost: manufacturers should cut all discretionary costs by limiting travel and
meetings, downsizing advertising, and sponsorships.
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Investment and R&D: make sure manufacturers review their expenditures on new
product programs and R&D.
Marketing and sales: manufacturers need to adjust their products and marketing to
meet the new demands of their customers.
Support of suppliers: manufacturers need to scrutinize the situation of their key
suppliers on a daily basis and provide support to the extent they can.
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6. Crisis in the Asian Markets
When talking about Asian markets, the markets first need to be separated into two
categories. The first category is that of an emerging market represented by China and
India. The second category is a developed automobile market which represents Japan and
South Korea.
6.1 Crisis in China

China today is one of the most important automobile markets in Asia. Since 2008,
China’s auto industry has become the world’s largest. The automobile industry in China
is comprised of 120 vehicle manufacturers employing nearly two million workers. Of the
automobiles produced, 44.3% were local brands (including BYD, Lifan, Chang’an,
Geely, Chery, Hafei, Jianghuai, Great Wall, and Roewe.) Most of the cars manufactured
in China are sold within China since China’s home market provides its automakers a solid
base.
Regarding the global auto industry crisis of 2008, the Chinese auto industry was
also affected. The yields of Chinese automobile were 9.3 million, an increased of 5.2% in
2008 compared with 2007, but the growth speed decreased by 16.8%. The total
automobile sales volumes reached nearly 9.4 million, rising by 6.7% but the growth
speed declined by 15%. There was a sharp reduction in the profits of Chinese automobile
manufacturers.
In order to promote the development of Chinese automobile manufacturers during
the financial crisis, the Chinese government was quick in making effective decisions
regarding any assistance being provided to the local automobile firms. The government
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introduced a massive stimulus package intended to help out the auto industry. From a
technology standpoint, this was to be done through reducing the purchase tax of
passenger automobiles with low emissions, supporting Chinese automobile
manufacturers in developing independent innovation and technical reform, and driving
the development of electric powered automobiles and its crucial accessories. On the
business end, the stimulus offered purchase subsidy policies to specific targets so as to
promote automobile consumption, advanced mergers and acquisitions among the
automobile industry, supported Chinese automobile manufacturers to develop
independent brands, and sped up the export base construction of automobile and
accessories.
Figure 6-1 China’s auto sale and prediction

[The above figure shows a decline of Chinese auto sales as growth speed slows down.]
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Figure 6-2 China’s Car Growth Rate

Source: China car time
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6.2 Crisis in India
India is the second fastest growing automobile market in the world. More than 3.7
million automotive vehicles were produced in India in 2010. The industry has a turnover
of more than USD $35 billion and provides direct and indirect employment to over 13
million people.
In February 2009, after citing an upcoming fall in the production numbers, State
Bank of India greatly reduced the interest rates applied to automotive loans. In the
starting months of 2009, a widespread marketing campaign was conducted by Tata
Motors involving the launch of theTata Nano automobile. Described as a “people’s car,”
Tata hoped that the consumers would be encouraged to buy this car at a time of severe
financial crisis because of its cheap price tag, which was about twenty-one hundred
dollars. “Consumers tend to go for best quality product at nominal rate.”63
These and many attempts taken by the government to take control of the crisis or
even to give advantage to the local manufacturers went on to help the local consumers as
well as the manufacturers, and therefore the Indian automotive sector not only emerged
from the crisis but continued going stronger on all terms such as manufacturing,
attracting foreign investment, and so on. One of the main reasons for this rapid rise is the
growing middle class in India, which prefers to buy cars rather than use the public
transportation system.
Another key advantage that the Indian car manufacturers have is cheap labor. This
tends to make India a very profitable venture to do business in for the rest of the world
since it offers such a large reduction in the costs of doing business when compared to any
63
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developed Western nation. “Cheap labor is one of the main reasons why firms choose to
invest in the developing world.”64 Still, whatever the cause, the Indian automotive sector
has the potential to grow even further and take a much bigger share in the global market.
Figure 6-3 India - Auto sales growth

[The above chart shows how the Indian market emerged from the auto crisis through
strong sales in its multi-purpose vehicles.]
6.3 Crisis in Japan

The crisis in the U.S. automotive industry hit Japan like a tsunami. Thousands of
workers lost their jobs. During the summer of 2008, a double-digit decline was reported
by Toyota, its first annual loss in decades. This was similar to the figures being reported
by Big Three firms in the U.S. Toyota associated this with its slow sales in Tundra
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pickups alongside a shortage of sales in its fuel-efficient brands like Corolla, Yaris, and
Prius. The automotive industry, seen as the engine of the nation’s economy, was facing a
severe threat.
Figure 6-4 Drop in Japanese Motor Vehicle Sales

Source: CEIC Data
In response, Toyota announced plans to idle its truck plants as well as shift
production towards other plants in order to focus more on the manufacture of in-demand
vehicles. Toyota declared in December 2008 that it was expecting its first ever loss in
seventy years of business in core vehicle making. This total loss was around $1.7 billion
related to the Toyota’s group operating revenue. Toyota also saw its sales drop to about
thirty-four percent.
December 22, 2008 was the day when Toyota slashed the forecasts of its profits
due to a slump in its sales. Often regarded alongside Honda as a huge success story and
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an inspiration for the entire local industries to follow, Toyota issued a statement saying
that it was expecting a narrow profit of five hundred and fifty-five million dollars for the
fiscal year ending in March 2009. Before this, Toyota had been projecting a huge profit of
about fourteen billion dollars for that period. Sales in America as well as in the overall
European markets were down by thirty-four percent for Toyota. All of this accumulated
towards a loss estimated to be around two billion dollars. The President of Toyota,
Katsuaki Watanabe, said that the impacts on the firm from the dire economic conditions
had been much wider, deeper, and faster than previously expected. He also noted that the
change which had affected the global economies was of an size and scale which only
occurs about once every hundred years, adding that Toyota was looking for loans from
the government in Japan while facing its first ever losses in some sixty years of its global
operations. Toyota announced on November 4, 2009, that it was immediately
withdrawing from Formula One, thereby completely ending its involvement in this sport
after eight seasons.
Honda motor’s sales also felt by 31.6 percent. The Honda motor firm announced
in December 2008 that it would be immediately leaving Formula One mainly because the
2008 economic crisis necessitated selling off their team. Honda also indicated that
following this action there could be large reductions in their contract staff as well as parttime employees. The bonuses of upper management were also to be reassessed: the
directors of the firm were to take a ten percent cut in their pay effective from January
2009. “Leadership of any firm should be flexible enough to absorb any upcoming
changes quickly.”65
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Other Japanese car manufacturers reported similar problems. Nissan reported its
first annual loss of $2.7 billion and announced that it intended to cut production as well
as reducing its total output by eighty thousand vehicles for the starting months of 2009.
Suzuki, the fourth biggest Japanese car manufacturer, announced in December
2008 that it would slash its Japanese production by about thirty thousand units mainly
because of falling demand. Suzuki also expected to face its first significant drop in profit
levels in eight years mainly due to the financial crisis. Fuji Heavy Industries, the biggest
Japanese transport equipment manufacturer as well as the maker of the Subaru model of
cars, announced in December 2008 that it would be exiting from the World Rally
Championship by the end of its 2008 season. The main reason for this was described as a
response towards a widespread economic downturn which was badly affecting the
automotive industry in general and other industries related to the main automotive sector
as well. This announcement came a day after Fuji’s competitor Suzuki exited from the
championships.
According to many reports in December 2008, Mitsubishi Motors was also set to
broaden its production slashes because of the continuous fall in demand of its products.
Mitsubishi, a well-known maker of Japanese Outlander sport-utility vehicles, announced
it would eliminate the night shifts completely at two of its domestic factories because the
severe global recession was drying out demand for their automobiles. “Job cuts in any
business should be proportional to its fall in profits or rise in losses.”66
The company would also halt its Mizushima plant’s night shift, excluding only the
mini car line; besides this the night work at its Okazaki plant was to be halted as well
66
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starting February 2. These slashes were a part of Mitsubishi’s overall strategy to reduce
its output by one hundred and ten thousand vehicles for the fiscal year ending in March,
mainly due to the falling sales in Japan, Europe, and the United States. “Firms often tend
to lower the median pay instead of cutting jobs, depending on what suits them.”67
It was also estimated that sales in Japan would fall to their lowest levels in the last
thirty years in 2009, according to the Japanese automobile manufacturers association.
Mitsubishi would also halt its passenger car production on every Friday of the upcoming
month at its Mizushima factory. The plant in Okazaki was to close on every Saturday for
the month of January as well as for five more days.
The Japanese Government provided loans through government-affiliated financial
institutions, and started tax reductions for fuel-efficient automobiles with good
environmental performance. It extended loans to mid- and large-sized companies which
were in trouble in regards to cash management; expanding a safety-net guarantee and
lending facility for small and medium firms. The government also expanded loans and
guarantees for Japanese-affiliate companies raising long-term funds overseas, and
provided a certain proportion of tax exemptions on both new and used cars which were
between 50% to 75%. The Japanese government also adopted a scrapping schemes and
encouraged the purchase new environmental-friendly vehicles.
6.4 Crisis in South Korea

The automakers in South Korea were generally observed to be at much more
profitable levels as compared to their Japanese and American counterparts, recording
better than expected growth figures in many of the depressed markets like that of the
67
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United States. Even despite the global economic crisis, the firm Hyundai-Kia was
successful in overtaking Honda Motors in 2008 as world’s fourth largest automaker. The
continued success of Hyundai-Kia was very unusual at a time when almost all of the
global automakers were experiencing a significant sales drop, with the leading auto
manufacturer General Motors even filing for bankruptcy protection. Hyundai-Kia took
great advantages from the automotive crisis by producing high quality yet affordable as
well as well-designed vehicles.
Due to the factors of rapid globalization, car manufacturing plants have been set
up at different locations throughout the globe such as in China, Eastern Europe, and the
U.S. Manufacturing facilities have been upgraded in order to produce products which are
engineered and designed for many different markets throughout the globe. Here, the
example of the Kia Cee’d is a leading one in which the product has been developed,
engineered, and designed in Germany and then built in Slovakia.
Unlike for many other firms throughout the world, the automotive crisis was
turned into a blessing for different South Korean automakers. The automaker Hyundai
made many great offers to its customers such as those who had lost their jobs could now
return their newly purchased car for a refund. This success and continued growth was
attributed to the nation’s well equipped and fuel efficient yet affordable automobiles with
great warranties like the Kia Cee’d, the Hyundai i30, and the Kia Picanto which attracted
consumers globally at a time of extremely severe economic slowdown, increasing
environmental concerns, and significantly rising oil prices. All of these factors gave the
automakers in South Korea a great competitive advantage against many of the luxury
vehicles and SUVs from the American, German, and Japanese automakers, especially in
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thefourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009, at the height of the entire
automotive crisis.
South Korean monetary policy helped as well, boosting the South Korean won in
global currency markets. This was especially true against the Japanese Yen and the
American Dollar, which also became a significant factor in boosting the price
competitiveness of exports of South Korea in many of the global key markets. “Currency
rates are greatly argued on international level since it may give unfair advantage to some
firms or nations.”68
Another important factor which helped in maintaining this positive momentum
was rapidly improving brand awareness; this was attributed to the positive reviews and
the awards the firm received throughout this time from many different sources. The brand
of Hyundai grew by 9% in 2008; this was enough to surpass Ferrari and Porsche. It also
utilized the sporting event of the Super Bowl for the promotion of its Hyundai brand in
America; this was the most expensive airtime for commercials in the world.
Yet even after all of these success factors, the automakers in South Korea were
not completely immune to the automotive crisis. An example of this comes from the
Hyundai Motor Company which in December 2008 was beginning to reduce its
production at various different plants located in India, China, Turkey, Slovakia, and the
United States. This was mainly because of fall in demand at various sectors of its sales
throughout the globe. “Shifting the manufacturing plants elsewhere in the world often
tends to bring more profits depending on factors such as cheap labor”.69
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The firm also missed its earlier projection of four million eight hundred thousand
units for the year 2008, and therefore announced it was freezing the wages for workers in
administration as well as shortening its factory operations because demand was
weakening amid the global financial crisis.
Sang Yong Motors, he fourth largest automaker in South Korea and owned by the
Chinese manufacturer Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC), was the worst
affected South Korean firm in the entire crisis, This was largely due to its mainly
manufacturing SUVs which were dependent on heavy fuel consumption and
consequently less popular during the economic downturn. This firm recorded losses in
four straight quarters. By 2008’s end they had losses of $20.8 million dollars for the third
quarter.
In the period from July to September in 2008, total sales plummeted sixty-three
percent to three thousand eight hundred and thirty-five vehicles. Its production lines were
idle after December 17 to apply reductions in its inventory. The automaker also halted its
production twice during the auto crisis. In December 2008, the parent firm SAIC gave the
Sang Yong union an ultimatum to accept its plans regarding restructuring or face a
complete withdrawal from the parent company. If this had been done then it would have
translated into certain bankruptcy for Sang Yong.

and Trade in Manufactures. London: Unwin Hyman, 1990. 39.
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Figure 6-5 Hyundai’s Car Sales

Due to the global crisis, the Korean government took the temporary policy action
of reducing the sales tax on vehicles by 30% for the period December 2008 to June 2009
in order to promote sales. This policy was extended until the end of 2009. Moreover, the
government launched a “Green Growth New Deal” to overcome the current economic
crisis, which included subsidizing the development of “green” cars and fuels. This
subsidy, amounting to over 2.2 trillion won, was allocated for automakers to design
electronicc and hybrid cars and to develop auto engines using “green” fuels. As such, the
government played a significant role in nurturing and restructuring the auto industry
during the economic crisis.
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7.

Government Stimulus
Government support for the automotive industry has been provided in a variety of

forms, including subsidies to firms and direct involvement in industry restructuring plans.
However, government interference is always a controversial topic.
The US Government committed nearly $40 billion to assist the automotive
industry (half of which was in the form of direct loans to Chrysler and GM) and another
$5 billion to supplier support programs, and also set up community assistance programs
to intervene in regions that were subject to difficulties as a result of the restructuring of
the industry. The debate remains whether this was too much or too little support. Given
the way the governments were getting involved, they were also assuming responsibility
for the outcomes of their actions. The risk that therefore arises from government support
is that companies will continue to build cars for a market where there is no demand for
what is being produced.
In France, there was restricted room for politicians. The government had an
implicit collaboration with the companies not to close any plants in exchange for public
funds. Other types of long-term commitment, such as agreements on the types of cars to
be produced in the future, would possibly be more useful. These actions are regarded as
protectionism.
In the case of Italy, the government was highly restricted when it came to giving
money to the automotive industry. The general policy was that while no plant would be
shut down, only a crisis putting a company at severe risk would constitute a valid reason
for government support.
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The action taken by Chinese Government included a cut in sales tax on smaller
cars, from 10% to 5%, a policy which was valid only in 2009. Another policy was the
increased consumption tax on vehicles with larger engines. Also, China published
regulations for passenger cars stating the need to achieve fuel efficiency standards. A
number of national companies have since grown into strong players so the external
multinationals are no longer threatening the domestic industry.
The cultural differences between the US, European, Chinese, Japanese, Indian,
etc. automotive industries are a fact. However, global competitiveness applies to all, and
needs to be faced and dealt with. As a result of the crisis, the trend towards further
consolidation of car manufacturers will be accelerated. About 18 global car
manufacturers in the three old core automotive regions – the United States, Western
Europe and Japan/Korea – will be significantly reduced in number over the next five
years. They will be challenged by car manufacturers based in China and India.
Many countries introduced car scrapping schemes (CARS or “cash for clunkers”
in the US) to cushion the overall downturn in economic activity, boosting sales in the
short term. As these programs were temporary and consisted mostly in a shift of
purchases from the future to the present, the surge in sales is likely to be reversed after
the schemes end. Evidence on the timing and magnitude of this “payback effect” varies
but suggests that over the short term, car sales may be temporarily depressed by the
termination of scrapping programs in many countries.
[Table 7-1 below shows that most of the countries’ governments would reduce or exempt
the automobile requisition tax on small to medium-sized cars, and/or on
eco/environmentally-friendly cars. ]
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Table 7-11 Principle measure to support the automobile sector
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To summarize, the government stimulus included the following methods:
1. Direct loans to automotive manufacturers, w
which
hich proved the most direct and
effective method to rescue auto companies in most of the countries during the
crisis. The US government’s bailout of GM and Chrysler is one of the biggest
economic headlines dating back to the 2007 economic crisis.
2. Scrapping schemes, which were promote
promoted
d by most countries’ governments,
proved to be an efficient way to boost auto sales in the short
short-term
term but were
quite controversial due to their long
long-term impact.
3. Tax schemes which included tax reductions and exemptions were a very
popular method adopted bby
y almost all governments to spur consumption in
automotive markets.
4. Incentives for investment in R&D and training was an indirect but long-term
long
method to help the auto industry via better technology and better-trained
better
employers.
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5. Targeted “green” incentives to promote electric, hybrid, and other
environmental-friendly vehicles were one of the most important long-term
methods, which clearly show the trend of the automotive industry’s future.
6. Other liquidity help for firms, like subsidies for manufacturers’ financing
operations, also showed obvious effects with regards to assisting
manufacturers.
7. Exchange-rate management was put on the agenda in countries like the US,
China, Japan, and South Korea in order to enhance the competitiveness of
domestic suppliers since exchange volatility can influence the volume of
potential gains during trading on an international level.
8. Tariffs or quantitative limits on trade were, for example, adopted by the
Russian government to increase tariffs on imported cars and by the US
government to level up the tariffs on Chinese tires. All protected their
domestic manufacturers who benefitted to a certain degree.
9. Other domestic content rules & practices, like the EU temporarily suspending
free trade agreements with their Asian counterparts, had a certain effect on
aiding their domestic markets during crisis.
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8.

The Future of the Automotive Industry
The crisis in the automotive industry was a sharp decline in a normal business

cycle, rather than a bubble. Auto demand in the developed countries is expected to pick
up again, though there may be changes in consumers’ choices. In the emerging market,
continued growth of GDP and populations will provide additional stimulus to demand.
In the developed world, the automotive industry will recover to pre-crisis levels as
the global economy recovers. Populations continue to age; older households divert a
greater proportion of income to vehicle purchase as they are relieved of the expense of
raising children. Consumers may well be more cautious about new car purchases in the
future, shifting to slightly less expensive cars. Thus the demand recovery may not be
completely proportionate, but will perhaps be in the region of 95%.70
In the developing world, demand is likely to return to 100% (even105%) of
previous levels with the return of economic health. One of the reasons is that a large
fraction of new car demand is “first car” rather than “replacement car” demand; hence it
is less deferrable. The used car market is often very immature and inefficient, so demand
flows primarily to new cars. Car finance availability has been patchy at best, such that
few future buyers are currently weighed down by vehicle debt. The income elasticity of
demand is higher than in the developed world, as even a small change in average GDP
can bring millions of new buyers into car-buying range very quickly. As car purchase
credit does become more available, more people will enter the car-buying market more

70

MacDuffie, 2009.

103

quickly.71
The nature of competition will have a particular influence. In the future, the US
market is expected to be more similar to the European one. Many autoworkers compete
intensively for 8% - 15% of the overall market. Developing countries will experience
intense competition among multinational OEMs, and new domestic firms will arise,
strengthened by this competition. New entrants (e.g. Geely in China and Tata in India)
will focus initially on high demand in their home markets, but will in a short time also
start to export to developed markets. Not all automakers will be huge; a place will remain
for highly capable smaller firms.
In the future, the concept of “Build where you sell” will prevail; new entrants will
pursue both mergers and acquisitions and “transplant” strategy. Large automakers, by
holding a more integral vehicle design and increasing levels of technology, will continue
to dominate the industry. Green initiatives will prompt a multiplicity of new technologies
and fuel types, with none achieving dominance in short-to-medium term. Employment
levels will continue to be relatively high, although differently distributed. Wages will be
lower and benefits under pressure.
A greater availability of low-cost cars (e.g. Tata’s Nano, selling for around
$3,500) is expected in the emerging markets. At higher incomes, ownership levels will
increase to multiple vehicles per family. Even where the very best public transportation is
available, total person trips tend to hit a threshold and future growth is absorbed by
vehicle-based mobility.
Overcapacity is always a problem in the US, where it is up to 40%. It also exists
in Japan and Germany, which hit between 11-20%. It is forecasted that overcapacity of
71
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global manufacturing will increase dramatically in the next five years.72 By 2016, China
will have the most capacity, followed by other Asian countries as a whole excluding
Japan. Therefore, balance capacity of production volumes becomes sufficient for OEMs
to expand their business while at the same time keeping down fixed costs to maintain a
healthy margin.
There are several effective ways to solve overcapacity. First, cutting production
on the manufacturers’ part. Second, encouraging consolidation and joint ventures. Third,
driving sales by incentives. Fourth, raising brand profile to fortify market share. Fifth,
increasing vehicle exports to existing or new markets.
Other main factors and implications on the future of automotive industry are as
follows:
Manufacturing will move within regions, to lower labor cost areas.
Product development will require new technological features, which will
determine whether products succeed. Increased use of common parts may increase
product development costs while decreasing purchasing costs.
Automakers will retain a crucial systems integration role and hence will have
more power than suppliers. Some suppliers may amass enough capabilities to become
automakers.
Purchases of small cars will closely follow the trend of gasoline prices.
Controlling fuel taxes, regulating fuel efficiency standards, and carbon regulations are
ways to change consumer and automaker behavior with respect to fuel efficiency.
It is uncertain if employment will return to previous levels. The change in the
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industry might also have negative implications for employment needs. Production will
continue to move to lower cost areas and closer to emerging markets, where the future
growth of demand is expected. Auto development will create more stable and highquality employment in the future.
Last but not the least, there will be a long-term perspective on the automotive
industry and climate change.73 Climate change and energy security concerns are the hot
topic in recent years for the automotive industry. CO2 reduction in the automotive
industry has been discussed for quite a while. Fuel savings and emissions reduction are
two different problems but lead to the same challenge – how to make vehicles more
efficient, while keeping additional costs at an acceptable level so as to make “green”
vehicles attractive to consumers. Low-emission vehicles offer the most convincing
solution on the road to sustainable mobility. Manufacturers will focus on innovation to
drive forward cleaner, “greener,” and more affordable vehicles. Further CO2 reduction
will come from improved powertrain and the development of more renewable energy
source. What vehicle manufacturers spend on new technologies will be to gain more
opportunities for themselves in the future, as well as building a base of protection for
their future development. Climate change is a global challenge which will affect us all;
therefore, solutions must beglobal. There is a trend that vehicle manufacturers, fuel and
energy producers, traffic management, logistics providers, politician, legislators,
consumers, and drivers will be working together to deliver the greatest benefits to society.
74
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Figure 8-11 Hybrid production by country of brand origin 2006 and 2014

Source: PwC Automotive Institute

<http://www.acea.be/news/news_detail/the_
<http://www.acea.be/news/news_detail/the_automotive_industry_and_climate_change_a_long_term_persp
imate_change_a_long_term_persp
ective/>.
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9.

Conclusion
This paper presented a detailed analysis on how the automotive crisis of 2008

affected car manufacturers. First examined was the relationship between the financial
crisis and the auto industry. As consumer credit and car loans tightened, car sales
decreased dramatically. Economic activity in the automotive industry usually moves in
line with the overall business cycle and a high correlation is also found between car sales
and private consumption. Then, the paper focused on American auto manufacturers,
especially the Big Three firms – namely General Motors, Chrysler and Ford – since they
were affected the most. It was seen that automobile sales in the United States were in a
decline even before the crisis started, mainly due to other factors which were closely
related to the auto industry such as the oil crisis. This directly led to American consumers
making a shift in their priorities and opting to buy smaller vehicles rather than the large
SUV’s, which had been the common choice.
The Big Three also pointed to some labor related statistics which showed how
many personnel were employed by the auto industry in the United States. Besides this the
hourly wages as well as benefits were discussed in some detail. In terms of salaries of
employees related to this industry, it was seen that experience mattered greatly, and
unionized workers such as from UAW got benefits from their employers through schemes
like the Jobs Bank. It was also argued that from the perspective of the employers, it was a
huge expenditure to do business with the workers since they were getting so many
benefits such as hourly rates, paid holidays, and even pensions. Therefore many analysts
argued that this scheme was a great hurdle keeping the companies from doing much more
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progressive things where the capital could have been applied.
It was also argued that the American companies were in severe crisis because they
had a lot of brands to look after, so after this two main types of claims were analyzed
where the first argued that the failure of the auto industry would be a great failure for the
economy itself. Supporters of this argument asserted that since the auto industry was
hiring millions of employees as well as helping the nation to lift its standards of living,
therefore it should be rescued, whereas the opponents said that the industry should be
made accountable for its mismanagement.
One key point to note here is regarding Chapter 11 bankruptcy; many arguments
were in favor as well as opposition of applying this procedure. Some points were noted
which focused on asking the U.S government to facilitate the sale of the auto companies’
assets as well as taking a more active role in the restructuring processes of the auto
industries. In contrast, many arguments were also against any government intervention in
this industry.
A timeline was discussed in detail regarding the federal government’s bailout
procedure as well as how the bailout bill was approved. Later on the issues dealing with
bankruptcy of General Motors and Chrysler were also noted. Some image issues
regarding the firms were discussed in which General Motors was apologetic for their
actions, as well as the selling of assets by the CEO’s of the Big Three firms in order to
answer the critics and maintain a positive image in the eye of common consumer. The
Big Three firms also intended to invest in more eco-friendly technologies in the future.
After the analysis of the American auto industry, there was a brief look at how the
auto industry crisis affected other major markets around the globe. In Europe, the United
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Kingdom and Italy were observed to be impacted much harder due to the crisis as
compared to Germany which relied on the positive image of its brands, its power of
export, and the rise in demand from developing economies to lift up its auto industry. A
detailed analysis was also given on Canada and how it managed to emerge from the
crisis; here the top-level management of auto firms was observed to be more responsible
in accepting their responsibilities afterwards the crisis as compared to their American
counterparts.
The Asian markets were also affected greatly by the crisis but they also emerged
much stronger, the Chinese manufacturers were aided by a huge stimulus from the
government, the Indians relied on their domestic consumption, and the Japanese took
difficult management decisions regarding many issues in order to ensure their survival as
well as their ability to compete. In all of Asia, the Korean auto manufacturers were seen
as the least affected by the crisis and according to some analysts they even profited while
the majority of the key global manufacturers were suffering from losses.
Finally, the future of automotive industry and the role of governments during
crisis was discussed. Though the government intervention was quite controversial, it
turned out to be successful. The future trends of the auto industry in the developed and
developing world were also examined, along with some efficient measures governments
might use going forward to rescue the auto companies. The measures taken did, in
general, benefit the auto sector but the drawbacks they created cannot be ignore.
The crisis in the automotive industry was not just a result of the credit crisis.
Otherwise, the industry only would have needed to wait until growth picked up again. In
reality, it needed to think how to restructure and rethink products and strategies. The

110

crisis in the automotive industry was not only an outcome of the financial crisis, but also
an opportunity to seek a new model of sustainability for the industry.
The restructuring of the automotive industry will bring both new winners and new
losers. Production will shift to new auto zones, and new fuel-efficient vehicles can
potentially lead to a new boom in vehicle sales. The final questions with regard to the
crisis and the future of the automotive industry are which companies and countries will
be able to take advantage of the industry’s new opportunities, and how this can be done
as a joint collaboration between all social partners.
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AvtoVAZ – Avtomobilniy Volzhsky Avtomobilny Zavod (Volga Automobile Plant)
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CAAM – China Association of Automobile Manufacturers
CAW – Canadian Auto Workers
CEO – Chief Executive Officer
CERA – Chartered Enterprise Risk Analyst
CFMA – Changan Ford Mazda Automobile
CNN – Cable News Network
CTF – Canadian Taxpayers Federation
DBRS – Dominion Bond Rating Service
EIA – Energy Information department
Fiet S.p.A – Fabbrica Italiana Automobili Torino (Italian Automobile Factory of Turin)
GAZ – Gorkovsky Avtomobilny Zavod (Gorky Automobile Plant)
GDP – Gross Domestic Product
GM – General Motor
IEA – International Energy Agency
ILO – International Labor Organization
INSEE – National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies
ISTAT – Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (Italian National Statistical Institution)
KIA – Korean’s second largest automobile manufacturer
LDF – Leyland DAF Vans
NAFTA – Northern American Free Trade Agreement
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OECD – Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPEC – Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PBGC – Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
R&D – Research and Development
SAIC – Beijing Automotive Industry Holding Co Ltd
SIGTARP – Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program
SUV – Sport Utility Vehicle
TARP – Troubled Asset Relief Program
U.K. – United Kingdom
U.S. – United States
UAW – United Automobile Workers

118

APPENDIXES
APPENDIX A

Table A Sale and share of total market by manufacturer
ETD
Sales

Sales

Market
Sep-11

Shar
e
YTD
2012

Sep-12

Sep-11

%
Chg

2012

2011

% Chg

%
Sep12

210,245

207,145

1.5

1,967,715

1,902,149

3.4

17.7

19.7

18.1

20

88,996

68,895

29.2

812,678

764,196

6.3

7.5

6.5

7.5

8

88,540

67,484

809,752

735,216

10.1

7.4

6.4

7.4

7.7

456

1,411

2,926

28,980

-89.9

Total Light Trucks

121,249

138,250

1,155,037

1,137,953

1.5

10.2

13.1

10.6

12

Domestic Truck

121,249

138,250

31.2
67.7
12.3
12.3

1,155,037

1,137,953

1.5

10.2

13.1

10.6

12

General Motors Corp.
Total Cars
Domestic Car
Import Car

Import Truck

...

Ford Motor Company
Total Cars
Domestic Car
Import Car

...

...

...

...

...

...

0.1

...

...

YTD
2011

...

0.3

...

...

174,454

174,860

-0.2

1,685,068

1,599,711

5.3

14.7

16.6

15.5

16.8

50,694

49,876

1.6

586,197

568,970

3

4.3

4.7

5.4

6

50,694

49,876

1.6

586,197

568,970

3

4.3

4.7

5.4

6

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

Total Light Trucks

123,760

124,984

-1

1,098,871

1,030,741

6.6

10.4

11.9

10.1

10.8

Domestic Truck

123,760

124,984

-1

1,098,871

1,030,741

6.6

10.4

11.9

10.1

10.8

Import Truck

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

Chrysler LLC

142,041

127,334

11.5

1,250,670

1,009,411

23.9

11.9

12.1

11.5

10.6

Total Cars

42,050

33,217

26.6

377,781

258,239

46.3

3.5

3.2

3.5

2.7

42,050

33,217

26.6

377,781

258,239

46.3

3.5

3.2

3.5

2.7

Domestic Car
Import Car

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

Total Light Trucks

99,991

94,117

6.2

872,889

751,172

16.2

8.4

8.9

8

7.9

Domestic Truck

99,991

94,117

6.2

872,889

751,172

16.2

8.4

8.9

8

7.9

Import Truck
Toyota Motor Sales USA
Inc.

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

171,910

121,451

41.5

1,571,424

1,194,524

31.6

14.5

11.5

14.4

12.5

97,662

67,097

45.6

915,274

652,290

40.3

8.2

6.4

8.4

6.9

Domestic Car

58,658

39,550

48.3

547,239

382,210

43.2

4.9

3.8

5

4

Import Car

39,004

27,547

41.6

368,035

270,080

36.3

3.3

2.6

3.4

2.8

Total Light Trucks

74,248

54,354

36.6

656,150

542,234

21

6.2

5.2

6

5.7

Domestic Truck

64,438

45,658

41.1

556,660

453,307

22.8

5.4

4.3

5.1

4.8

9,810

8,696

12.8

99,490

88,927

11.9

0.8

0.8

0.9

0.9

117,211

89,532

30.9

1,066,458

859,797

24

9.9

8.5

9.8

9

62,657

43,809

43

585,649

465,740

25.7

5.3

4.2

5.4

4.9

Total Cars

Import Truck
American Honda Motor Co
Inc.
Total Cars

119

Domestic Car

55,182

34,556

508,372

364,630

39.4

4.6

3.3

4.7

3.8

9,253

59.7
19.2

7,475

77,277

101,110

-23.6

0.6

0.9

0.7

1.1

Total Light Trucks

54,554

45,723

19.3

480,809

394,057

22

4.6

4.3

4.4

4.1

Domestic Truck

54,172

40,626

442,143

363,329

21.7

4.6

3.9

4.1

3.8

382

5,097

33.3
92.5

38,666

30,728

25.8

0.5

0.4

0.3

91,907

92,964

-1.1

866,484

774,079

11.9

7.7

8.8

7.9

8.1

56,953

61,685

-7.7

550,571

513,809

7.2

4.8

5.9

5.1

5.4

47,527

50,394

451,573

406,784

11

4

4.8

4.1

4.3

9,426

11,291

-5.7
16.5

98,998

107,025

-7.5

0.8

1.1

0.9

1.1

Total Light Trucks

34,954

31,279

11.7

315,913

260,270

21.4

2.9

3

2.9

2.7

Domestic Truck

17,251

14,719

17.2

156,886

118,568

32.3

1.5

1.4

1.4

1.2

Import Truck

17,703

16,560

6.9

159,027

141,702

12.2

1.5

1.6

1.5

1.5

60,025

52,051

15.3

539,814

492,914

9.5

5

4.9

5

5.2

46,850

41,297

13.4

443,669

393,201

12.8

3.9

3.9

4.1

4.1

13,175

10,754

22.5

96,145

99,713

-3.6

1.1

1

0.9

1

24,135

25,521

-5.4

209,484

191,315

9.5

2

2.4

1.9

2

16,695

14,519

141,248

120,305

17.4

1.4

1.4

1.3

1.3

1,403

4,163

15
66.3

29,653

24,914

19

0.1

0.4

0.3

0.3

15,292

10,356

111,595

95,391

17

1.3

1

1

1

7,440

11,002

47.7
32.4
100
31.3
17.2
27.6
48.8
12.3

68,236

71,010

-3.9

0.6

1

0.6

0.7

505

2,082

-75.7

67,731

68,928

-1.7

0.6

1

0.6

0.7

46,122

65,875

-30

0.4

0.6

0.4

0.7

26,604

36,866

-27.8

0.2

0.3

0.2

0.4

13,397

20,813

-35.6

0.1

0.1

0.2

13,207

16,053

-17.7

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.2

19,518

29,009

-32.7

0.2

0.3

0.2

0.3

483

9,123

-94.7

Import Car

Import Truck
Nissan North America Inc.
Total Cars
Domestic Car
Import Car

Hyundai Motor America
Total Cars
Total Light Trucks
Mazda Motor of America
Inc.
Total Cars
Domestic Car
Import Car
Total Light Trucks
Domestic Truck
Import Truck

...

180

...

...

...

...

...

7,440

10,822

4,806

5,803

1,934

2,671

572

1,118

1,362

1,553

2,872

3,132

16

778

-8.3
97.9

2,856

2,354

21.3

19,035

19,886

-4.3

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.2

48,105

35,609

35.1

434,914

367,405

18.4

4

3.4

4

3.9

Total Cars

33,854

18,505

82.9

302,127

210,917

43.2

2.8

1.8

2.8

2.2

Total Light Trucks

14,251

17,104

16.7

132,787

156,488

-15.1

1.2

1.6

1.2

1.6

Subaru of America Inc.

27,683

20,934

32.2

245,503

195,550

25.5

2.3

2

2.3

2.1

21,286

14,086

51.1

187,162

137,199

36.4

1.8

1.3

1.7

1.4

14,707

10,746

36.9

120,793

106,129

13.8

1.2

1

1.1

1.1

6,579

3,340

97

66,369

31,070

113.6

0.6

0.3

0.6

0.3

6,397

6,848

-6.6

58,341

58,351

0.5

0.6

0.5

0.6

139

256

45.7

1,538

1,970

-21.9

6,258

6,592

-5.1

56,803

56,381

0.7

Mitsubishi Motors N A, Inc.
Total Cars
Domestic Car
Import Car
Total Light Trucks
Domestic Truck
Import Truck
Kia Motors America Inc.

Total Cars
Domestic Car
Import Car
Total Light Trucks
Domestic Truck
Import Truck

...

...

...

0.1

...

...
0.5

...

0.1

...
0.6

...
0.5

0.6

120
American Suzuki Motor
Corp.
Total Cars
Domestic Car

1,921

2,026

416

469

...

Import Car

...

-5.2
11.3
...

416

469

1,505

1,557

157

Import Truck
Mercedes-Benz

19,149

20,284

-5.6

4,391

5,447

-19.4

...

11.3

...

...

0.2

0.2

0.2

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

0.2
0.1
...

4,391

5,447

-19.4

14,758

14,837

-0.5

188

-3.3
16.5

1,436

1,643

-12.6

1,348

1,369

-1.5

13,322

13,194

1

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

24,950

23,428

6.5

207,048

182,510

13.4

2.1

2.2

1.9

1.9

15,451

14,496

6.6

124,665

111,237

12.1

1.3

1.4

1.1

1.2

Total Light Trucks

9,499

8,932

82,383

71,273

15.6

0.8

0.8

0.8

0.7

Domestic Truck

4,416

5,100

6.3
13.4

46,089

40,817

12.9

0.4

0.5

0.4

0.4

Import Truck

5,083

3,832

32.6
100
100
100
100

36,294

30,456

19.2

0.4

0.4

0.3

0.3

480

4,612

-89.6

...

...

...

...

430

4,482

-90.4

...

...

...

...

50

130

-61.5

...

...

...

...

50

130

-61.5

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

Total Light Trucks
Domestic Truck

Total Cars

Saab

...

429

Total Cars

...

381

Total Light Trucks

...

48

Domestic Truck

...

48

Import Truck

...

Volvo

...

...

4,977

5,042

Total Cars

2,194

Total Light Trucks

...

...

...

0.1
...

0.1
...

0.1
0.1

...

0.2
...

51,634

52,155

-1

0.4

0.5

0.5

0.5

2,868

-1.3
23.5

26,604

29,805

-10.7

0.2

0.3

0.2

0.3

2,783

2,174

28

25,030

22,350

12

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.2

36,339

27,036

34.4

323,090

235,458

37.2

3.1

2.6

3

2.5

32,487

23,599

37.7

284,877

200,182

42.3

2.7

2.2

2.6

2.1

Domestic Car

17,702

15,746

12.4

151,645

138,752

9.3

1.5

1.5

1.4

1.5

Import Car

14,785

7,853

88.3

133,232

61,430

116.9

1.2

0.7

1.2

0.6

Total Light Trucks

3,852

3,437

12.1

38,213

35,276

8.3

0.3

0.3

0.4

0.4

Audi of America Inc.

12,302

9,725

26.5

100,694

84,981

18.5

1

0.9

0.9

0.9

Total Cars

8,995

6,950

29.4

73,455

60,646

21.1

0.8

0.7

0.7

0.6

Total Light Trucks

3,307

2,775

19.2

27,239

24,335

11.9

0.3

0.3

0.2

0.3

21,761

21,750

186,397

177,679

4.9

1.8

2.1

1.7

1.9

12,695

15,407

127,752

128,033

-0.2

1.1

1.5

1.2

1.3

2,932

-100

127,752

125,101

2.1

1.1

1.4

1.2

1.3

Volkswagen of America Inc.
Total Cars

BMW of North America Inc.

12,695

15,267

0.1
17.6
100
16.8

Total Light Trucks

9,066

6,343

42.9

58,645

49,646

18.1

0.8

0.6

0.5

0.5

Domestic Truck

7,496

6,334

56,499

48,995

15.3

0.6

0.6

0.5

0.5

Import Truck

1,570

9

18.3
999.
9

2,146

651

229.6

0.1

2,736

2,170

26.1

25,015

22,664

10.4

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.2

Total Cars

1,366

1,240

10.2

14,681

12,633

16.2

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

Total Light Trucks

1,370

930

47.3

10,334

10,031

3

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

1,004

1,111

-9.6

9,550

9,315

2.5

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

Total Cars
Domestic Car
Import Car

Porsche Cars NA Inc.

Jaguar *

...

140

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

121

Land Rover **

3,636

2,740

32.7

31,674

25,650

23.5

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.3

Mini *

4,899

3,999

22.5

48,531

41,635

16.6

0.4

0.4

0.4

0.4

Ferrari *

207

183

13.1

1,437

1,266

13.5

...

...

...

...

Maserati *

269

199

35.2

1,984

1,706

16.3

...

...

...

...

Bentley *

239

151

58.3

1,644

1,260

30.5

...

...

...

...

21

28

-25

223

255

-12.5

...

...

...

...

5

4

25

48

33

45.5

...

...

...

...

600,956

487,239

23.3

5,656,927

4,733,646

19.5

50.5

46.2

51.9

49.7

Domestic Car

177,564

149,215

19

1,743,914

1,577,544

10.5

14.9

14.2

16

16.6

Import Car

423,392

338,024

25.3

3,913,013

3,156,102

24

35.6

32.1

35.9

33.2

587,909

566,483

3.8

5,243,022

4,784,526

9.6

49.5

53.8

48.1

50.3

345,000

357,351

-3.5

3,126,797

2,919,866

7.1

29

33.9

28.7

30.7

242,909

209,132

16.2

2,116,225

1,864,660

13.5

20.4

19.8

19.4

19.6

1,188,865

1,053,722

12.8

10,899,949

9,518,172

14.5

100

100

100

100

25

25

230

229

Rolls Royce *
Maybach *
Total Car

Total Truck
Domestic Truck
Import Truck
TOTAL LIGHT VEHICLE
SALES
Selling Days
† Estimate * Imported cars
only ** Imported trucks only
Source:
www.motorintelligence.com

...

...

...

...

...

...
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APPENDIX B

Table B Top 20 vehicles, current month's sales

Ford F - Series PU
Chevrolet
Silverado PU
Toyota Camry
Honda Accord
Dodge Ram PU
Chevrolet Cruze
Nissan Altima
Ford Escape
Toyota Corolla /
Matrix
Honda CR-V
Honda Civic
Ford Focus
Toyota Prius
Hyundai Elantra
Hyundai Sonata
Chevrolet Equinox
Chevrolet Impala
Volkswagen Jetta
Kia Optima
Ford Explorer

% Chg from
YTD
Sep-12 '11
2012
55,077
1.2
463,733
36,425
34,252
29,182
25,973
25,787
24,448
23,148

-16.6
37.8
56.6
5.9
42.5
0.4
14.5

298,200
314,788
247,847
213,593
180,600
234,040
200,075

23,026
22,268
21,546
19,736
18,932
18,305
17,332
15,835
15,259
14,750
14,304
14,049

42.6
13.6
57
91.4
103
27.2
-4.7
2.2
10.4
-1.8
131
23.9

222,703
213,381
234,029
186,686
183,340
152,575
175,346
166,862
140,179
127,028
114,728
117,803

Source: www.motorintelligence.com

% Chg from
YTD 2011
11.4
0.6
37.1
36.9
20
-3.7
16.7
6.5
19.2
32.5
39.8
36
96.6
3.1
0.3
15
1.5
-7.3
105.8
21.5
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Table C Segment totals, ranked by Sep unit sales

Cars
Midsize
Small
Luxury
Large
Light-duty trucks
Pickup
Cross-over
Minivan
Midsize SUV
Large SUV
Small SUV
Luxury SUV
Total SUV/Crossover
Total SUV
Total Cross-over

Sep-12
600,956
278,935
240,288
80,863
870
587,909
165,695
250,133
67,151
57,979
18,107
16,578
12,266
355,063
104,930
250,133

Source: www.motorintelligence.com

% Chg from
Sep '11
YTD 2012 % Chg from YTD 2011
23.3
5,656,927
19.5
15.8
2,800,376
21.6
49.9
2,099,090
24.2
-1.2
750,206
10.6
-79.4
7,255
-88.3
3.8
5,243,022
9.6
-3.4
1,416,783
8.5
13.1
2,234,046
9.1
3.2
640,725
16.9
6.4
520,044
11.6
-29.6
168,771
-7.4
6.9
150,219
16.8
-6.3
112,434
5.7
7.6
-3.6
13.1

3,185,514
951,468
2,234,046

8.7
7.7
9.1
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Table D New passenger car registrations by market
%
Chg
12/11

Jan - Jul
'12

Jan - Jul
'11

% Chg
12/11

-3.5
+5.2
-11.5
+4.3
-7.9
+27.9
+30.1
-25.2
-7.0
-5.0
-42.1
+20.3
+8.6
-21.0
-2.0
-2.0
-7.4
-26.2
-9.7
-35.1
-29.4
+12.0
-13.5
-17.2
-7.9
+9.3

215,226
321,817
11,386
7,447
105,391
101,001
10,449
73,372
1,197,906
1,882,261
38,186
32,260
71,065
924,583
6,357
7,253
32,851
362,890
170,090
62,661
39,348
40,568
32,432
471,393
160,709
1,201,564

216,900
361,331
10,992
9,077
100,402
100,874
8,676
79,974
1,385,283
1,883,486
65,216
26,887
81,158
1,153,332
5,995
7,695
33,125
370,438
161,811
106,128
40,259
39,766
37,685
521,126
176,663
1,161,272

-0.8
-10.9
+3.6
-18.0
+5.0
+0.1
+20.4
-8.3
-13.5
-0.1
-41.4
+20.0
-12.4
-19.8
+6.0
-5.7
-0.8
-2.0
+5.1
-41.0
-2.3
+2.0
-13.9
-9.5
-9.0
+3.5

-7.8
-7.8

7,580,466
7,117,485

8,145,551
7,696,306

-6.9
-7.5

63,761

-7.5

462,981

449,245

+3.1

444
11,189
25,822

+29.3
+6.5
-3.2

5,428
81,275
202,308

3,500
79,694
184,296

+55.1
+2.0
+9.8

+0.1

289,011

267,490

+8.0

-7.5

7,869,477

8,413,041

-6.5

-7.5

7,406,496

7,963,796

-7.0

EUROPEAN UNION*

July
'12

July
'11

AUSTRIA
BELGIUM
BULGARIA
CYPRUS
CZECH REPUBLIC
DENMARK
ESTONIA
FINLAND
FRANCE
GERMANY
GREECE
HUNGARY
IRELAND
ITALY
LATVIA
LITHUANIA
LUXEMBURG
NETHERLANDS
POLAND
PORTUGAL
ROMANIA
SLOVAKIA
SLOVENIA
SPAIN
SWEDEN
UNITED KINGDOM
EUROPEAN UNION
(EU27)*

28,268
36,701
1,616
1,021
11,158
16,718
1,526
6,443
148,924
247,860
5,757
4,475
4,431
109,452
895
1,051
4,195
31,078
20,898
9,257
6,005
6,252
4,105
65,322
18,076
143,884

EU15

935,368
876,366

29,307
34,886
1,826
979
12,118
13,068
1,173
8,616
160,199
260,907
9,940
3,719
4,079
138,510
913
1,072
4,529
42,092
23,134
14,269
8,501
5,583
4,743
78,914
19,621
131,634
1,014,33
2
950,571

EU11*

59,002

ICELAND
NORWAY
SWITZERLAND

574
11,920
24,998

EFTA

37,492

EU27*+EFTA

972,860

37,455
1,051,78
7

EU15+EFTA

913,858

988,026
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Figure D New passenger car registrations in July
New Passenger Car Registrations in July
Results in the EU 2003 - 2012

Units

1400000

Percentage

+7.5
+3.6

1100000

-1.3
-5.5

800000

-1.4

-1.9
1.9
-7.3
-18.5

500000

+10.0
+5.0
+0.0
-5.0
-7.8
-10.0
-15.0
-20.0

Jul/03 Jul/04 Jul/05 Jul/06 Jul/07 Jul/08 Jul/09 Jul/10 Jul/11 Jul/12

New Passenger Car Registrations
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Table E Sales by top manufacturing group in China

Source: LMC Automotive Monthly Report
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BEIJING, Jan 17 (Reuters) - Car sales in China climbed 5.2 percent in 2011, the slowest
pace since the nation's car culture took off at the turn of the century, as consumers
shunned local brands after Beijing scrapped tax incentives for small cars.
A total of 14.5 million sedans, sport utility vehicles and multi-purpose vehicles were
shipped to dealers last year, the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers
(CAAM) said.
Table F China 2011 car sales up 5.2 pct
--------------------------------------------------------------Dec
pct change
y-t-d
pct
--------------------------------------------------------------NATIONAL TOTAL BY CAAM
Cars
1,368,900
4.6
14,472,400
5.2
Vehicles
1,689,600
1.4
18,505,100
2.5
--------------------------------------------------------------The following table shows passenger car and vehicle sales in
December and year-to-date by manufacturers (units; percent
changes are from a year earlier).
--------------------------------------------------------------Dec
pct change
y-t-d
pct
--------------------------------------------------------------*BMW
NA
NA
232,586
37.6
BMW brands
NA
NA
217,068
37.0
7 Series
5 Series
3 Series
MINI
Chery
-5.9
Geely
1.3
Emgrand
Englon
GLEagle
Mercedes-Benz
S-Class
SUV
GLK
M-Class
* Dongfeng
11.7
PV
CV
DF Nissan JV
PV
CV

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
47,755
10,941
16,083
20,731
23,230
3,700
NA
NA
NA
204,338
163,324
41,014
132,392
92,957
39,435

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
-15.8
NA
NA
NA
30
NA
NA
NA
NA
18.1
24.0
-0.5
20.3
34.0
-3.0

33,500
70,850
46,871
15,518
641,700

26.2
68.4
34.0
47.7

421,385
NA
NA
NA
198,520
31,050
54,335
23,805
15,860
2,172,723
1,646,410
526,313
1,477,289
960,775
516,514

NA
NA
NA
35.0
NA
85
NA
NA
16.1
-0.3
15.8
27.0
-0.4
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DF PSA JV
DF Honda
DF Own brand car
Dongfeng Yueda Kia
*Changan
-15.6
Chongqing Changan
CFM
FAW
Nissan
21.9
*Volkswagen
17.7
VW brand
Audi brand
Imported
Skoda
Bentley
Lamborghini
SAIC
12.0
Shanghai VW
Shanghai GM
Own brand cars
SAIC-GM-Wuling
*Ford Motor
CFM (Ford brands)
Jiangling
Great Wall Motor
Export
Honda Motor
Guangqi Honda
Dongfeng Honda
Mazda Motor
*Toyota Motor
*General Motors
Shanghai GM
Buick
Chevrolet
Cruze
Sail
Cadillac
SAIC-GM-Wuling

42,095
26,797
1,475
NA
NA

5.2
36.7
-46.9
NA
NA

404,139
255,468
26,028
432,518
2,008,500

8.2
-2.0
-6.0
29.0

146,250
41,623
NA
119,000

-10.2
-3.1
NA
26.7

1,663,841
418,600
2,601,400
1,247,700

-10.1
1.7
1.7

NA

NA

2,260,000

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
327,091

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
13.2

1,720,000
313,036
57,900
220,100
1,780
403
4,008,967

13.8
37.0
89.0
21.9
97.6
63.2

104,928
80,529
16,888
114,570
49,238
30,788
17,509
NA
NA
78,319
51,522
26,797
23,456
NA
196,797
77,699

12.3
-10.1
20.2
36.0
10
4.0
17.0
NA
NA
35.8
35.3
36.7
-33.0
NA
9.8
10.8

113,491

35.7

1,165,827
1,231,539
162,004
1,301,118
519,390
320,658
194,588
494,800
85,000
617,764
362,294
255,470
214,799
883,000
2,547,171
1,200,355
645,537
595,068
221,196
166,693
30,008
1,285,820

16.4
18.5
1.0
5.4
7.0
5.0
9.0
22.5
50.0
-4.5
-6.1
-2.0
-10.0
-4.4
8.3
16.2
17.4
9.4
NA
NA
72.8
4.8

Wuling
1,193,708
3.9
Sunshing minivan
572.980
NA
Baojun
21,854
NA
FAW-GM
5,268
NA
56,132
NA
*BYD
52,009
1.4
448,484
-13.7
BAIC Group
NA
NA
1,526,300
2.4
----------------------------------------------------------------

* Ford's China car sales, including CFMA, excluded Mazda's sales in 2011.
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* Toyota's 4.4 percent sales decline in 2010 is calculated based on its 2010 figure.
* Sales of GM's Sunshine van, which accounts for 48 percent of SGMW's sales, were
calculated based on GM data. Baojun was launched in August of 2011. Shanghai GM and
SGMW's sales include domestic sales only.
* BYD's sales include domestic passenger car sales only.
* VW's sales including models sold in Mainland China and Hong Kong. Year-on-year
growth rate of Skoda, Bentley and Lamborghini are calculated based on 2010 figures.
Imported Audi sales are for Mainland China only.
* BMW sales include BMW and Mini only.
* Dongfeng's sales include the Hong Kong listed company only, which holds most of
its state parents auto assets.
* BAIC, FAW and Changan's data are provided by CAAM.
NOTE: General Motors Co operates a 49-51 car-manufacturing venture with top
Chinese automaker SAIC Motor Corp in Shanghai. It also makes mini-vans and pick-up
trucks in a three-way tie-up with SAIC and Liuzhou Wuling Automobile in southern
China. It has another venture with FAW Group, making light commercial vehicles.
Toyota Motor Corp operates car ventures with Guangzhou Automobile Group Co Ltd
and FAW Group in China.
Hyundai Motor Co has a car venture with BAIC Group. Kia Motors Corp makes cars
in China in a tie-up with Dongfeng Motor Group, Jiangsu Yueda Investment Co Ltd.
Ford Motor makes Fiesta, Focus, Mondeo and other sedans in China in a three-way tieup with Chongqing Changan Automobile Co Ltd and Japan's Mazda Motor Corp. It also
holds 30 percent of Jiangling Motors Corp, which makes Ford's Transit vans.
Volkswagon makes cars in partnership with SAIC and FAW.
Honda Motor makes cars in tie-ups with Dongfeng Motor Group and Guangzhou
Automobile Group Co.
Dongfeng Motor also makes vehicles in tie-ups with Honda Motor, Nissan Motor Co
Ltd and PSA Peugeot-Citroen. The Dongfeng Nissan venture makes both cars and light
commercial vehicles.
Daimler AG makes Mercedes-Benz models in China in partnership with Beijing
Automotive Industry Holding Corp.
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SAIC operates car ventures with GM and Volkswagen AG. It also makes mini-vehicles
in southern China with GM and subsidiary Liuzhou Wuling Automobile.
BYD Co Ltd is 10 percent owned by U.S. billionaire investor Warren Buffett's
Berkshire Hathaway.
Great Wall Motor Company is China's largest SUV maker.
Geely Automobile Holdings Ltd is a private-sector carmaker. Its parent Zhejiang Geely
in August took over Ford Motor's Volvo car unit, marking the biggest acquisition in
Chinese auto industry.
BMW AG makes cars in partnership with parent of Brilliance China Automotive
Holdings Ltd.
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APPENDIX G

Current and Future Trends in the Automotive Industry
The effects of the global economy were on the agenda at the annual Original
Equipment Suppliers Association (OESA) meeting
by Sasha Banks, November 2010
At the annual meeting of the Original Equipment Suppliers Association (OESA)
on November 8 in Detroit, Michigan, executives from leading automotive original
equipment manufacturers and suppliers provided an economic and operational analysis of
the global automotive industry. Here are some highlights.
How the Recession is Affecting Automakers
Overall, panelists expressed strong confidence in the economic recovery, although
all agreed the turnaround is slow. Key future strategies for the automotive industry were
to boost productivity and competitiveness (especially in Southern Europe), rein in
healthcare and pensions costs, clean up the housing wreckage, and help the chronically
unemployed.
In the United States, intensifying pressures for the domestic automotive industry
are affecting the price of raw materials — up almost 50 percent — and the declining U.S.
dollar. While U.S. exports have become very appealing, other countries are waging a
currency war to prevent their currencies from dropping. Another factor affecting domestic
automakers is the growing demand for high-tech equipment –boosting growth in
production and exports by 10 to 30 percent. The rates of interest, currency, growth (less
than 2 percent) and inflation, which remain low, are inhibiting a more accelerated
recovery. Exacerbating this slow growth is deleveraging, where consumers increase

132

personal savings and reduce their debt; a 9 percent unemployment rate; and uncertainty
over the future of government policies such as the Bush administration’s tax cuts and the
Obama administration’s healthcare bill.
In Europe, the global recession continues to thwart economic recovery as it is
plagued by high unemployment, weak wage gains, and a tight credit market. These
factors put tremendous restraint on consumer spending and business investment—the
latter of which is limited by substantial excess capacity and concerns about the strength
and sustainability of recovery. Yet while Germany has benefitted from exports to China,
Italy and Spain continue to struggle, and Greece has become virtually insolvent. In fact,
according to the panelists, all holders of Greek bonds will have to take a 30 percent
“haircut” on their investments.
Among emerging economies, the economic condition includes low debt, strong
growth of six to eight percent, rising threats of inflation, interest and pressure on
exchange rates, and increasing risks of an overheated asset bubble. China has an
accumulated US$2.2 trillion in reserves, speculated to mask its hidden debt, and the
Asia/Pacific region is counting on exports to strengthen its domestic economy. Consumer
spending accounts for only 35 percent of China’s economy versus India’s, whose
consumer spending accounts for over 60 percent. While India’s economy is behind China,
be prepared for the surge. In Latin America, debt levels are low and sustained growth
levels are estimated to be between five to six percent.
The Future of the Automotive Industry
Analysts predict a V-shaped growth pattern for the automotive sector globally.
Yet, despite market-imposed capacity constraints, anticipated production is expected to
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increase from 11 million units in 2010 to 15.5 million units by 2011. While the U.S.
vehicle sales forecast is encouraging, healthcare and pension costs threaten margins for
U.S. automakers. This year, the U.S. vehicle sales recovery has been driven by fleet sales
— sales of a large number of vehicles to companies such as rental car agencies and
commercial truck operators. This demand is defined by the miles driven per year, the
average age of the fleet (9 years), population growth rates, and the age of drivers.
Slowing the demand for new vehicles domestically is the growing rate of the retired
population, who will drive their vehicles 40 percent less and make fewer new vehicle
purchases.
As automakers gear for the next-generation industry transformation, panelists
cited a number of factors that will be affecting the resurgence of original equipment
manufacturers and suppliers alike. These include increasingly rigorous legislative
mandates on emissions, safety and quality; intense pressure to scale, particularly for the
emerging markets; new or evolving joint-venture business models due to all the recent
mergers and acquisitions in the industry; and narrowing product portfolios. All of this
must also be tied to a myopic focus on taking the number-one or number-two market
positions and delivering best-in-class project margins.
Speaking about the future of the American automotive industry, Retired Vice
Chairman of General Motors Company Bob Lutz delivered a riveting, sharp-tongued
criticism of automakers. Lutz proclaimed that graduates of U.S. Ivy League business
schools — including himself — have contributed to the demise of economic growth and
product excellence in the United States. According to Lutz, MBAs don’t understand the
power of image, style or fashion trends on vehicle sales and the driver experience.
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Instead, he said, MBA-produced analysis and profit optimization models focus only on
short-term internal targets, and are not driven by the consumer market. In a plea for
corrective action, Lutz demanded renewed focus on long-term product, service and
customer experience excellence. He said General Motors’ management should be less
concerned with cost and more concerned with whether the vehicle is selling in the
market. Lutz concluded with a mandate for the industry to correct its numbers-driven
myopia with a broader perspective and corporate culture based on a long-term vision of
consumer-driven product excellence.
Technology and Automobiles
Meeting speakers emphasized the influence of technological advances in the
future of automotive companies. High-tech equipment will become more and more
prevalent — for example, in-vehicle telematics, which provide drivers with instant safety,
security and communications services. Practical applications include voice assisted
driving directions, parking, acceleration and vehicle failure detection. Telematics-driven
infotainment services include Bluetooth wireless and satellite radio. Future applications
will include vehicle-to-vehicle communications to ensure vehicles keep a safe distance
from each other to avoid and perhaps eliminate collisions. Automakers will be pressured
to develop a global platform, upon which vehicles are designed, engineered and
produced, to leverage the most capital-intensive equipment and resources initially, and
then customize and accessorize later for regional preferences. Perhaps most critically, car
manufacturers and suppliers will need to embrace a long-term consumer vision to
succeed, in the same way in which Apple has done with its iPod, iPhone and iPad
products.
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Table H-1 Automotive Industry and Economy

(in € million)

Turnover

Investments

Public Revenue

Argentina

3,519

Australia

18,929

Austria

13,900

580

8,315

Belgium

18,225

302

7,155

Brazil

26,997

1,141

Canada

77469*

2496**

China

86,984

5,330

205

20

1

12,091

663

1,032

Denmark

1,165

46

5,867

Egypt

2,901

1,661

1,911

Finland

1,076

36

3,807

France

111,901

4,196

34,000

Germany

227,666

11,900

44,314

162

17

3,200

8,144

432

16,893

1,014

3,858

1,071

Italy

54,135

3,450

40,954

Japan

435,610

6,450

66,444

Korea

62,993

2,239

16,615

Malaysia

6,084

1,263

Mexico

3,348

Netherlands

7,876

81

16,202

893

Portugal

4,457

176

Romania

1,836

308

Russia

7,019

223

Slovakia

8,711

1,056

Slovenia

1,544

40

South Africa

20,602

277

3,459

Spain

75,104

2,740

23,212

Sweden

24,784

861

5,590

Croatia
Czech Rep.

Greece
Hungary
India
Indonesia

Poland

Switzerland

4,252

887

9,701

11,122

10,837
6,897
654

4,689
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Thailand

11655*

443

2,871

Turkey

28,196

502

10,127

UK

58,238

1,590

46,099

USA

425,106

30,416

64,289

Total

1,889,840

84,801

433,160

*Gross production value **gross fixed capital formation
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Table H-2 Employment
EMPLOYMENT
Argentina

12,166

Korea

246,900

Australia

43,000

Malaysia

Austria

32,000

Mexico

Belgium

45,600

Netherlands

24,500

47,000
137,000

Brazil

289,082

Poland

94,000

Canada

159,000

Portugal

22,800

1,605,000

Romania

59,000

China
Croatia
Czech Rep.
Denmark
Egypt
Finland

4,861

Russia

755,000

101,500

Serbia

14,454

6,300

Slovakia

57,376

73,200

Slovenia

7,900

6,530

South Africa

112,300

France

304,000

Spain

330,000

Germany

773,217

Sweden

140,000

Greece
Hungary
India
Indonesia

2,219
40,800
270,000
64,000

Italy

196,000

Japan

725,000

Switzerland

15,500

Thailand

182,300

Turkey

230,736

UK

213,000

USA

954,210
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Table H-3 2011 Production Statistics
2 0 1 1 P R O D U C T I O N S TAT I S T I C S

Argentina

577,233

Commerc
ial
vehicles
252,925

Australia

189,503

34,690

224,193

-8.1%

Austria

130,343

22,162

152,505

45.2%

Belgium

560,779

34,305

595,084

7.2%

Brazil

2,534,534

871,616

3,406,150

0.7%

Canada

990,483
14,485,32
6

1,144,410

2,134,893
18,418,87
6

3.2%

1,191,968

7,866

1,199,834

11.5%

53,072

28,659

81,731

-30.0%

Finland

2,540

0

2,540

-61.9%

France

1,931,030

311,898

2,242,928

0.6%

Germany

5,871,918

439,400

6,311,318

6.9%

211,218

2,313

213,531

1.0%

3,038,332

888,185

3,926,517

10.4%

561,863

276,085

837,948

19.3%

Iran

1,413,276

235,229

1,648,505

3.1%

Italy

485,606

304,742

790,348

-5.7%

7,158,525

1,240,129

8,398,654

-12.8%

488,441

45,254

533,695

-6.0%

1,657,080

1,022,957

2,680,037

14.4%

40,772

N.A.

40,772

-56.7%

722,285

108,346

830,631

-4.5%

Portugal

141,779

50,463

192,242

21.1%

Romania

310,243

24,989

335,232

-4.5%

Russia

1,738,163

249,873

1,988,036

41.7%

Serbia

25,494

740

26,234

45.5%

Slovakia

639,763

0

639,763

13.9%

Slovenia

168,955

5,164

174,119

-17.6%

312,265

220,280

532,545

12.8%

4,221,617

435,477

4,657,094

9.0%

1,819,453

534,229

2,353,682

-1.4%

Sweden

188,969

N.A.

188,969

-13.0%

Taiwan

288,523

54,773

343,296

13.1%

Country

China
Czech Rep.
Egypt

Hungary
India
Indonesia

Japan
Malaysia
Mexico
Netherland
s
Poland

South
Africa
South
Korea
Spain

Cars

3,933,550

Total

%
change

830,158

15.9%

0.8%
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Thailand

537,987

919,811

1,457,798

-11.4%

Turkey

639,734

549,397

1,189,131

8.6%

97,585

5,492

103,077

24%

UK

1,343,810

120,189

1,463,999

5.1%

USA

2,966,133

5,687,427

8,653,560

11.5%

146,300

33,260

179,560

14.5%

367,138
59,870,83
8

128,009
20,163,82
4

495,147
79,989,15
5

2.0%

Ukraine

Uzbekistan
Others
Total

3.1%

Man-made CO2 Emission
Globally, road transport is responsible for about 16% of man-made CO2
emissions. It is a common misconception that global warming is mainly caused by cars
and trucks. It is important to understand that there are other, larger, contributors and ALL
sources of CO2 emission must be addressed if the problem is to be solved.
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Figure H Man-made CO2 Emission

